Selections from the Study Notes on the Cheng weishi lun (Seong yusingnon hakgi)
By the Cheonggu Śramaṇa Daehyeon, Translated by A. Charles Muller
October 12, 2013
Table of Contents
|2.||Study Notes on the Cheng weishi lun|
1.1. Daehyeon’s Silla Consciousness-only Background
The Seong yusingnon hakgi (hereafter, Hakgi) is a writing on Consciousness-only thought composed by the monk Daehyeon, who was active in the middle of the eighth century. 1 Although a detailed biography of Daehyeon 2 has not been transmitted to the modern era, it is clear from the accounts found in the Samguk yusa 三國遺事 that he was a figure of considerable influence. He worked during the apex of Silla scholastic Buddhist studies in the middle of the eighth century, based primarily at the Yongjangsa 茸長寺 in Namsan 南山, where he was also known for his deep interest in the practice of Maitreya devotion. The only record of his activities consists of an account of his appearance at court in 753 during an intense drought. After Daehyeon’s conducting of a rain-prayer ritual, it said that it rained so heavily that all of the wells were overflowing (T 2039.49.1009c25–1010a07) . At the beginning of this entry in the Samguk yusa, Daehyeon is labeled a “patriarch of Consciousness-only,” which gives some indication of the status he held as a Yogâcāra philosopher of the Silla.
In addition to his mastery of the Yogâcāra doctrine, it is reported, as well as indicated in his writing, that Daehyeon exhibited a strong interest in the gamut of Buddhist teachings, endeavoring to understand the Buddhist tradition in all its aspects. As the author of more than fifty works, he is cited, along with Wonhyo 元曉 (617–686) and Gyeongheung 憬興 (7th c.), as one of the “three pens” of the Silla period. 3 Although the breadth of his interest is seen in his writings on Huayan, Lotus, Nirvāṇa, Prajñā, Tathāgatagarbha, Madhyamaka, Vinaya, Pure Land, and so forth, his twenty works on Yogâcāra constitute by far the largest segment of his work. His commentaries dealt with topics from early Yogâcāra, and extended up through the thought of Dharmapāla, as well as the Buddhist logic, as found in the new translations of Xuanzang. Daehyeon chose the appellation Gojeokgi 古迹記 (Record of Ancient Traces) as the subtitle for many of his works, expressing his vision of himself as the receiver and transmitter of the earlier commentarial tradition. Daehyeon was an inheritor of the tradition of Woncheuk’s 圓測 (613–696) interpretation of Consciousness-only/Yogâcāra (唯識; K. Yusik) 4 through Dojeung 道證 (7th c.), and from this position, he compared and criticized Yusik thought with that of the Hwaeom of Fazang 法藏 (643–712) and Wonhyo, while also taking up in earnest the various approaches to truth utilized by Yusik and Madhyamaka, comparing, critiquing, and synthesizing these. His doctrinal interests were initially sparked by nature-arising 性起 traditions such as Hwaeom and the Awakening of Faith, but from the study of these texts, he was gradually led into Yogâcāra, within which he ended up becoming totally immersed. But rather than trying to establish clear boundaries between Yusik and the nature-arising traditions, he sought, in the spirit of Wonhyo before him, to treat the differences in position with an ecumenical approach, and to try to see how they could fit together. 5 Daehyeon, in the Hakgi, pays little attention to the criticisms leveled at Woncheuk and Dojeung by Huizhao 慧沼 (648–714), at the same time citing equally from Kuiji 窺基 (632–682) and Woncheuk, working their ideas into a single system. Through this, his influence extended to the prolific Japanese Hossō commentator Zenju 善珠 (727–797). 6 In his Gisillon naeui yaktam gi 起信論内義略探記, while one can clearly see the influence of Fazang and Wonhyo, he does occasionally criticize Wonhyo’s views, demonstrating an independent viewpoint.
The writings of the Consciousness-only scholars who carried out their the activities from the middle of the Silla period took the thought and beliefs of Daehyeon as their model, and during the reign of King Gyeongdeok, a distinct Yusik school came into formation. From the standpoint of the middle way of Consciousness-only, Daehyeon worked toward ending the confrontation of the viewpoints of essential nature versus characteristics; he seriously practiced Maitreya devotion, and was venerated as founding teacher of the Beopsang school, which provided the framework for subsequent Consciousness-only scholar-monks of the Silla to carry out their doctrinal studies. His extant works include the Yaksa bonwon gyeong gojeokgi 藥師本願經古迹記, Beommanggyeong gojeokgi 梵網經古迹記, and Beommanggyeong bosal gyebon jong-yo 梵網經菩薩戒本宗要 among others. 7
1.2. The Seong yusingnon hakgi
The Seong yusingnon hakgi 成唯識論學記, the subject of the present study, is considered to be Daehyeon’s Yogâcāra magnum opus. 8 In this work, Daehyeon explicates the central canonical source of the East Asian Yogâcāra tradition, the Cheng weishi lun 成唯識論 (hereafter CWSL), from the three perspectives of “revealing the tenets and showing the essence” 顯宗出體門 “analyzing the title” 題名分別門 and “explicating the sentences of the text” 解釋文義門. The CWSL is primarily a translation by Xuanzang of Dharmapāla’s commentary on the Thirty Verses on Consciousness-only 唯識三十頌, by Vasubandhu世親, but it also includes edited translations of other masters’ works on the same verses. The aim of this work was to explain the entire received system of Yogâcāra in an organized fashion, and thus it is probably the most complete and balanced exposition of Yogâcāra in the entire Buddhist tradition. It deals in depth with all seminal Yogâcāra theories, including the eight consciousnesses, five natures, five paths, two hindrances, and so forth. The Hakgi is the only extant complete commentary on the CWSL by a classical Korean scholar. Although Daehyeon is usually understood to be an inheritor of the Ximing 西明 tradition of Woncheuk, the Hakgi cites from Kuiji’s major commentaries more than from any other scholar’s works. Furthermore, at numerous junctures, Daehyeon criticizes the positions of Woncheuk and Dojeung, recommending the position of Kuiji. In this text, Daehyeon cites Kuiji 565 times, Woncheuk 439 times, and Dojeung 146 times, offering us some degree of indication as to the extent to which Daehyeon’s work represents a theoretical synthesis between the approaches of Woncheuk and Kuiji. 9
The portion of the Hakgi that we have treated are the three sections of the text itself, starting with its preface—the causes and conditions for writing 教起因縁分. Next is the explanation of the main text, which is the explication of the thirty verses, called “the settled doctrine of the holy teaching.” 聖教定説分 Here, the practices and effects of the realm of Consciousness-only are explained. Finally, the “transmission section” is explained, distinguished here as the “section on settling on a title and dedicating the teaching to others” 結名廻施分. Here the verses of dedication of merit are explained. 10 In the present work we have introduced the explication of the content of the first and second verses from the sections on the causes and conditions for initiating the teaching and the section on the settled doctrine of the holy teaching, from within the sections on Showing the Teaching and Revealing the Essence, and the Explication of the Text.
1.3. Outline of the Hakgi
(The sections marked with 〇 are treated in this translation.)
The portions from the Explication of the Text that are treated in this work can be located within the following outline.
In the structure of the interpretation of the CWSL seen in the Hakgi, we can see numerous divergences from the widely disseminated interpretations of Kuiji. Whereas Kuiji analyzed the Triṃśikā by the categories of aspects 相, nature 性, and rank 位, Daehyeon divides them by sphere 境, activity 行, and effects 果. 11 Additionally, in the explanation of the three levels of transformation of consciousness, at first Kuiji explains eight stages of ten of the transforming consciousnesses, while Daehyeon explains seven stages of ten. While we can see a bit of difference, the terminology used is mostly the same. There are also various differences in the terminology used between the two scholars in the ten sections on the interpretation of seeds. In the second transformation, the manas, the two scholars also have a number of differences in their terminology in the eight levels/ten sections. In the third transformation, that of the sixth consciousness, a difference can be seen in the division of nine parts as opposed to seven parts. 12
It is clear from the extent and character of the citations of Daehyeon’s Hakgi in the writings of the various Silla Consciousness-only scholars that this is a vitally important work for gaining an understanding of the character of the “New Yogâcāra” thought in the Silla. Moreover, this work is seen extensively cited in Gyeondeung’s 見登 Daeseung gisillon dong-i yak tamgi (Summary of Inquiries into the Comparison of the Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith [with the CWSL] 大乘起信論同異略探記), another attestation to its extensive influence during this period. The Hakgi also contains citations from five non-extant works of Woncheuk, including his Commentary on the Cheng weishi lun and related texts, as well as much on the thought of Dojeung 道證 that is not otherwise available.
Besides this, there is much material that helps to fill in the present lacunae of information on the thought of other major Silla Buddhist thinkers of the new Yogâcāra, such as Uijeok 義寂 (7th c.) and Sungyeong 順璟 (7th c.). Regardless of whether the positions attributed to Bhāvaviveka and Dharmapāla can actually be traced to them as individuals, Daehyeon takes us through a detailed comparison of their ostensive respective positions on various points. Not only providing further evidence for the actual occurrence of a debate between Madhyamaka and Yogâcāra, Daehyeon’s work marks a phase in the establishment of a distinctive character of Yogâcāra studies in Silla Buddhism. Daehyeon takes the position that the debate regarding emptiness and existence is something that takes place only at the level of language. His point is that the purpose of both parties, and of the debate itself, is to lead sentient beings to awakening. The central standpoint for Daehyeon’s articulation of the Hakgi is the new Yogâcāra, which is defined from beginning to end in Dharmapāla’s Vijñaptimātrasiddhi, but at the same time, Daehyeon, taking the tendencies found in Woncheuk’s approach toward Consciousness-only as a foundation, tends to seek harmony between the approaches of emptiness and existence, as well as nature and characteristics. This tendency toward harmonization is a hallmark trend of Silla Buddhism, which can be seen most clearly carried out in the works of Wonhyo.
2. Study Notes on the Cheng weishi lun
Compiled by the Cheonggu Śramaṇa Daehyeon.
Translated by A. Charles Muller
Study Notes on the Cheng weishi lun, Fascicle One. 13
This treatise briefly takes up its discussion from three approaches: the first is that of disclosing the tenets and showing the essence; the second is the analysis of the words of the title; the third is the exegesis of the text.
2.1. Disclosing the Tenets and Showing the Essence
2.1.1. The Debate regarding Emptiness and Existence
言顯宗者、且有二宗。一淸辨等、述般若言、「有爲無爲、俗有眞空。」 如掌珍頌、「眞性有爲空、如幻緣生故。無爲無有實、不起似空華。」 二護法等、依解深密言、「一切法有空不空。」 如中邊頌、「虛妄分別有、於此二都無。此中唯有空、於彼亦有此。」
“Disclosing the tenets” refers to two tenets: the first is that of Bhāvaviveka 14 (and others), who says in his Prajñāpradīpa: 15 “The conditioned (saṃskṛta) and the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta), the conventionally existent and true emptiness.” 16 As the verse of the *Karatala-ratna 17 says: “From the viewpoint of true nature the conditioned is empty; it is like an illusion. The unconditioned has no substance; its non-arising resembles sky-flowers” (T 1578.30.268b21–22) . The second is the tenet of Dharmapāla 18 and his followers, who, relying on the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra 19 say that all dharmas are empty and non-empty. 20 As the Verses of the Madhyânta-vibhāga 21 say: “Deception and discriminated existence: herein both are inexistent; herein there is only emptiness; in that [emptiness], there is also this [discrimination]” (T 1601.31.477c9–10) .
It is said that there is a debate over these two truths. As the Treatise on the Buddha-bhūmi Sūtra 22 says, referring to this: “After a thousand years, there will be a debate regarding emptiness and existence within the schools of the Mahāyāna.” 23 What kind of debate?
且有爲中、唯識云、「我法非有、空識非無、離有離無、契於中道。」 此遣所執、存餘二性。掌珍論云、「如爲棄捨墮常邊過、說彼爲無、亦爲棄捨墮斷邊過、說此爲有。謂因緣力所生眼等、世俗諦攝、自性是有、不同空華全無有物。但就眞性、立之爲空。」 此存世俗。勝義皆空。
Concerning the conditioned, the CWSL 24 says: “Self and dharmas are not existent; emptiness and consciousness are not non-existent; free from existence and non-existence, they accord with the middle way.” 25 This gets rid of that to which one is attached, leaving behind the two natures. The *Karatala-ratna says:
It is like, when, in order to remove the fault of falling into the extreme of eternalism, claiming that that is non-existent, and in order to remove the fault of falling into the extreme of nihilism, claiming that it exists. This means that the eyes and so forth that are produced by the power of causes and conditions, are, from the perspective of the conventional truth, possessed of inherent nature, and are not the same as sky-flowers and so forth that are entirely non-existent. However, from the perspective of the ultimate truth, they are said to be empty. (T 1578.30.272b2–5)
This position resides in the conventional. From the perspective of the ultimate truth, all are empty.
又、無爲中二說不同。護法菩薩對淸辨宗二空卽眞. 唯識論、「性顯二空、非圓成實、眞如離有離無性故。」 淸辨菩薩對護法宗二空所顯。「於唯無有一切所執、立爲眞如。」 非但出體二說不同、勝義有無、亦爲乖諍。如唯識云、「此識若無、便無俗諦。俗諦無故、眞諦亦無。撥無二諦、是惡取空。」
Furthermore, the two explanations from the perspective of the unconditioned are not the same. Dharmapāla Bodhisattva counters the tenets of Bhāvaviveka, who hold that both kinds of emptiness are true. The CWSL says: “Nature indicates that the twofold emptiness is not the perfected [nature] 26 because thusness is by nature free from existence and free from non-existence.” 27 Bhāvaviveka Bodhisattva opposes that which is expressed by Dharmapāla’s tenet of two kinds of emptiness. The *Karatala-ratna says: “Based only on the lack of anything to grasp, thusness is established” (T 1578.30.274b9–10). Not only is there disagreement between the two theories in terms of revealing the essence; there is also debate over existence and non-existence in terms of the ultimate truth. As the CWSL says: “If this consciousness did not exist, there would be no conventional truth. Without conventional truth, there is also no ultimate truth. Negating both truths is the wrong attachment to emptiness” (T 1585.31.39b17–18).
The *Karatala-ratna says: “From the perspective of the conventional truth, the Buddha teaches the existence of nirvāṇa. This is like the Buddha’s teaching the existence of miraculously transformed sentient beings. 28 Since we admit this existence, there is no error of contradicting one’s own tenets. 29 However, from the perspective of true nature, analytical cessation 30 is rejected.” 31 By this we have confirmation that there was really a debate, as has been related by Woncheuk. 32
有說二師、都無諍論。淸辯不許勝義無故。如掌珍云、「此非有言、唯遮有性。功能斯盡、更不詮無。如世間說、非白 33 絹言、未必彼言卽詮黑故。」
Some say that there is absolutely no discrepancy between the positions of the two masters. This is because Bhāvaviveka does not admit the non-existence of the ultimate truth. As the *Karatala-ratna says: “This word ‘non-existent’ only rejects the existence of nature. Once it has exhausted its function, it does not further express non-existence. It is like the worldly term ‘non-white silk,’ which does not necessarily express that the silk is black.” 34
We can furthermore resolve this problem by following what he says: “From the perspective of real natures, all that is conditioned does not exist at all. The point of this thesis is to repudiate all those who follow erroneous views. The point of the tenet under discussion is to say that emptiness is natureless; the distinctions seen from the perspective of delusive appearances are not all exclusively denied as being non-existent, [and therefore you should not raise this objection].” 35
護法勝義、亦不許有。如廣百云、「現在亦非勝義諦有、從緣生故、如幻事等。」 又、「說空言、是遮非表。非唯空有、亦復空空。」 乃至廣說.
This also cannot be accepted as existent in Dharmapāla’s understanding of the ultimate truth. As the Dasheng guangbai lun shi lun 36 says: “The present is also not ultimately existent, since it is an illusory phenomenon, produced by conditions” (T 1571.30.206c12–13). [The same text] also says: “Also, saying this word ‘emptiness’ is a refutation—it does not posit. It does not only empty existence; it also empties emptiness.” 37 This explanation continues at length.
The scholar associated with the theories refuted by the *Karatala-ratna is not Dharmapāla. In his commentary to the Catuḥśataka-śāstra-kārikā, Dharmapāla Bodhisattva has also refuted the associated scholar, so he agrees with that text. With this as their proof, the master Sungyeong 38 and his group have transmitted the thesis that there are no discrepancies on this point.
In the explanation of these two, the words are disputed but the intent is the same. It is like debating about the fact that a stūpa is rough on the bottom and fine on the top. This is because, in order to begin to establish one’s own position, one must acknowledge the position of others. The proposition of Dharmapāla must raise up that which is attached to: without expressing freedom from the four lemmas, 39 the natures of emptiness, existence, and so forth are all attached to. And because the two natures exist in some mysterious way, they are not completely non-existent. Based on this explanation, the two kinds of emptiness are not real—emptiness is but one aspect; the non-empty also exists. The severance of this path is called thusness. Bhāvaviveka Bodhisattva takes up the standpoint of conventional existence, free from all kinds of non-existence. This is because if he chooses true non-existence, then the conventional is also non-existent. The two natures are mysteriously non-existent, since they are unobtainable. If one only rejects existence, one ends up with non-existence. Since one also rejects non-existence, it is said to be unobtainable. “Unobtainability” is the meaning of freedom from the four lemmas. It is as Asaṅga 40 says in his Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitôpadeśa: 41 “The four lemmas are all subsumed under attachment to dharmas.” 42
For this reason, master Wonhyo and so forth [point out that] while there is disagreement about the words, the intent is the same. Since students of dull faculties in the latter age will, based on these disputes, skillfully produce [their own] understandings, now, relying on the middle way of Consciousness-only transmitted by Dharmapāla, the triad of objects, practices, and realizations 43 is taken as the tenet of this theory, and thus it is included in the Abhidharma upadeśa of the bodhisattva canon. 44
2.2. Exegesis of the Text
第三解釋文義門者、論有三分。一教起因緣分, 二聖教正說分, 三結名廻施分。
In the third part, the exegesis of the text, the treatise is divided into three parts: (1) the motivations for initiating the teaching, (2) the accurate explanation of the holy teaching, (3) settling on a name, and expressing the intent to transmit to others.
2.2.1. The Motivations for Initiating the Teaching
The first part has two aspects, namely the verse and the prose. The verse also has two parts: the first part is the taking of refuge; the second part is the way this is carried out. “Bowing my head” is an expression of reverence. The words “consciousness-only” and so forth indicate the content of that which is revered. Since one’s head touches the ground, it is called “bowing my head.” Relying on one’s body one bows one’s head; through the three modes of activity, 45 one articulates reverence. One experiences faith and shame in the presence of the virtuous, and expresses one’s deep reverence through the practices of purity.
所敬之體、樞要三釋。一云唯敬涅槃。以自性常最爲勝故。謂四涅槃體、皆眞如正歸果位。言滿分淨、分者、位也。唯識性者、性淨涅槃、其餘、無餘。名滿淨者、要果滿時方證得故 [十地未有、已盡煩惱及苦相故]。分淸淨者、無住涅槃、許十地位已證得故 [已有不住二邊用故。無著般若論中有證。].
As far as the content that is revered, the Shuyao 46 has three explanations. The first says that one only reveres nirvāṇa. This is because its own-nature is always the most excellent. Speaking of the essences of the four kinds of nirvāṇa, 47 all are the stage of the fruition of correct reliance on thusness. Concerning the words “partial and complete in purity,” “partial” refers to [being at a certain] level. “Nature of Consciousness-only” is the nirvāṇa of innate purity, 48 with remainder and without remainder. “Complete purity” must be attained at the time of the completion of realization. [This is because before the ten grounds are completely practiced, one has already eradicated affliction and the marks of suffering.] “Partial purity” refers to nirvāṇa with no abode, 49 which is already acknowledged as being attained at the level of the ten grounds. 50 [This is because one is already functioning without lingering in the two extremes (of reification and nihilation). This is attested in Asaṅga’s Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitôpadeśa. ] 51
又、二乘涅槃、唯假擇滅、唯得一解。大般涅槃、三事圓滿。三事有二。一、體、三名三事、二、義、三名三事。能觀智慧、所觀法身、離繫擇滅、名體三事。一眞如上慧性名般若、德作名法身、離縛名解脫、名義三事。 [准知餘二、有義三事。謂慧當體名般若、已離二障名解脫, 衆德所集名法身。說如如智法身故。擇滅當體名解脫, 慧所得果名般若、二斷二智名菩提。故含衆德, 故名法身。如瑜伽釋、「如來一切有爲功德有餘攝、無爲功德無餘攝故。」 然唯無住性常圓寂、具體三事名大涅槃、如涅槃記。]
Furthermore, the two-vehicle nirvāṇa is only an extinction provisionally attained by annihilation of afflictions through the power of analysis; it only includes one type of liberation. Mahāparinirvāṇa is the full completion of the three activities. The three activities have two kinds. The first is the essence, which includes three names and three works; the second is the meaning, which includes three names and three works. 52 The observing wisdom, and the dharma body that is observed, and the analytic cessation freeing from bondage are called the three activities of essence. The supreme sapience of thusness is called prajñā 般若; its attribute is called the dharma body 法身; freedom from bondage is called liberation 解脫. These are called the three activities of meanings. 53 [Inferring the remaining two: there are three activities of meaning. Namely, wisdom applied to essence is called prajñā; already being free from the two hindrances is called liberation; the gathering of myriad attributes is called the Dharma body. This is because the cognition of thusness is the Dharma body. Analytic cessation applied to essence is called liberation; the realization attained by sapience is called prajñā; the two kinds of elimination and the two kinds of cognition are called bodhi. Therefore they include myriad attributes; therefore they are called Dharma body. As the Yogâcārabhūmi-śāstra-kārikā explains: “All the Tathāgata’s conditioned virtues are included in the stages of remainder. Unconditioned virtues are included in the stages of no remainder.” 54 Yet it is only the non-abiding nature that is eternally perfectly quiescent. Full embodiment of the three works is called great nirvāṇa, as is explained in the The Sūtra of the Abiding Dharma Recorded Just Prior to Buddha’s Nirvāṇa 55 ]
In the next interpretation, one only reveres bodhi. Since the bodhisattvas seek wisdom rather than perfect quiescence, [the purified cognitive faculties of] marvelous observation, equality, and so forth, even though still within the causal aspect of practice, are already attained. Revering the realization of the four [forms of purified] cognition 56 is called complete and partial purity. Some attain partial purity, based simultaneously on the two kinds of cognition. 57 The “nature of Consciousness-only” means the raising to our attention the object(s) that are witnessed. Yet with an intention toward reverence, they are able to realize bodhi, 58 because they possess the requisite power of merit.
One more interpretation is that of simultaneous reverence for bodhi and nirvāṇa. The nature of Consciousness-only is nirvāṇa. Its original nature is pure, and it is not discussed in terms of full or partial purity. Full and partial purity are seen in the case of bodhi. This is because in the causal stage 59 of practices one obtains two [kinds of purified cognition], and perfect realization includes all four. As it says in the ninth fascicle [of the CWSL]: “The aim of establishing Consciousness-only is to have sentient beings experience these two realizations of the transformation of the basis 60 —bodhi and nirvāṇa.” 61
疏有四解、一敬法非人。諸佛所師所謂法故。二敬人非法。如瑜伽六十四云、「若欲造論、先敬二師。恭敬法故、敬本論師。 [佛也] 恭敬義故、禮開闡師 [菩薩也] 」。
The Commentary [on the CWSL] has four interpretations: 62 The first is revering the dharma and not the person; this is because that which the buddhas teach is called the dharma. The second is revering the person and not the dharma. As it says in fascicle sixty-four of the Yogâcārabhūmi-śāstra: “If you want to write a treatise, you must first pay obeisance to two teachers. Out of respect for the dharma, you first show reverence to the original source of the treatise, [the Buddha]. Out of respect for the content of the treatise, you make obeisance to the commentators who reveal the meaning [The bodhisattvas].” 63 Regarding the nature of Consciousness-only, full purity is the characteristic of the Original Teacher, and partial purity is the characteristic of the bodhisattvas. Third is simultaneous reverence for both person and dharma. This is because the dharma serves as the standard, and the person spreads the teachings. The fourth is reverence for [the Three Treasures of] Buddha, Dharma, and Saṃgha. Based on this treatise, the nature of Consciousness-only is the Dharma [treasure], complete purity is the Buddha treasure, and partial purity is the Saṃgha treasure.
Even though seven motivations are explained 64 for the author of the original verses in his writing of the treatise, the Trepiṭaka 65 Xuanzang focuses his discussion on paying reverence to the excellence of the person. It is like the seven declensions in Sanskrit, which, although they are fundamentally equivalent in value, everyone takes up the explanation of the fourth, the dative case. Yet the Sanskrit texts take up the explanation of the seventh, the locative case. 66 The only way that the nature of Consciousness-only can be distinguished is in terms of full and partial purity, and thus he distinguishes it that way. Thus, here, the only thing cited in terms of paying reverence is that of complete and partial purity within the nature of Consciousness-only, which makes the nature of Consciousness-only to be like the seventh voice, the locative.
依論第九、略有二性。一虛妄性、謂遍計所執 [卽所遣淨], 二眞實性、謂圓成實性 [卽所證淨]。復有二性、一世俗、謂依他起 [卽所斷淨]。二勝義、謂圓成實 [卽所得淨]。樞要三性二諦、分出多句、繁而不要。於中淨者、所敬應知所爲之中。
Based on fascicle nine, we can identify two natures: one is that of deception, i.e., that which is pervasively discriminated 67 [Which excludes purity]. The second is reality, i.e., the perfectly real nature [Which realizes purity]. There are two further natures: the first is elaborated from a conventional standpoint, which is the other-dependent nature 68 [namely, the purity of that which is eliminated]. The second is explained from the ultimate standpoint, which refers (again) to the perfectly real. 69 [namely, the purity that is attained]. The explanation of the three natures and two truths in the Shuyao expands into a lengthy discussion, getting entangled in non-essentials. Within this, it is reverence for purity to which attention should be paid.
有說、但爲法住、利樂有情、意住法故。有說、但爲利人、雖“釋彼說、” 意利他故。如實義者、雙爲人法、自利利他。謂“釋彼說、” 而令法住、法住利他、爲自利故。如攝大乘、「爲利自他法久住、故我解釋攝大乘。」“我” 謂假者。基云安慧、測云護法。彼說卽滿分淨者之教。然瑜伽釋造所爲、皆應於此論。所爲攝利樂義、別如佛地論瑜伽廣說.
One theory holds that if he only maintains the dharma, he will bring benefit and joy to sentient beings, and therefore he wants to maintain the dharma. [Another] theory holds he wants to bring benefit to others, so even if he “elaborates this teachings” [of the Triṃśikā], his intention is to bring benefit to others. The truth of the matter is that for the purposes of both the person and the Dharma, he elevates himself and elevates others. The text says, “elaborates this teaching,” yet he causes the dharma to remain, and the remaining dharma benefits others, in order to benefit himself. As the Commentary to the Summary of the Great Vehicle 70 says: “In order to benefit myself and others, and so that the dharma will be forever supported, I explicate the Mahāyānasaṃgraha.” 71 The word “I” (in the CWSL) here is a provisional designation, which Kuiji takes to indicate Sthiramati, 72 and Woncheuk takes to indicate Dharmapāla. “This teaching” is the teaching of complete and partial purity. Nonetheless, the stated intentions of the composition of the Yogâcārabhūmi-śāstra-kārikā fully match those of this treatise. 73 The inclusion of the meanings of benefit and joy are especially explained at length in the Fodijing lun and the Yogâcārabhūmi-śāstra.
[Treatise] (Fascicle One)
I offer homage to those purified wholly or in part through the nature of Consciousness-only.
I now elaborate their teachings to bring benefit and joy to all sentient beings.
Thus I write this treatise for those who are perplexed in regard to the two kinds of emptiness, so that they can produce correct understanding.
By way of explanation, he uses a verse at the outset to indicate his intention to compose this exegesis. Now, clarifying the composition of Vasubandhu, 74 the passage has three sections. In the first, representing Sthiramati et al., the purpose is to cause the readers to produce an understanding, eliminate the hindrances, and attain realization. The second, which Woncheuk attributes to Nanda 75 and Kuiji attributes to Citrabhāna 76 et al., is about eliminating the hindrances and realizing emptiness, awakening to the marks of Consciousness-only. The third, attributed to Dharmapāla et al., obliterates all mistaken attachments and discloses the principle of Consciousness-only. The first can also be broken down into three levels: that of producing understanding prior to the grounds, eliminating the hindrances during the grounds, and attaining Buddhahood. This is the first.
言「今」者, 正顯世親造頌時也。言「二空」者, 生空法空、如下諸執、皆言迷謬。生法我無執有名謬、不悟無我名爲迷故。
The word “now” refers to the time when Vasubandhu wrote the verses. “Two kinds of emptiness” refers to emptiness of beings and emptiness of dharmas. Like the below attachments, all are called confusion and error—this because attaching to selfhood of beings and dharmas when they are not existent is called error, not being aware of selflessness is called confusion.
. . . so that this understanding can eliminate the two heavy hindrances. The two hindrances 77 arise concurrently based on attachment to self and dharmas. If you realize the two kinds of emptiness, these hindrances will directly be eliminated.
Explanation: The second section deals with the elimination of the hindrances. Their naming as “heavy hindrances” is an indication of their severity. Since each of the hindrances has both light and heavy types, their suppression is hard to describe. It is only the attachment to self and dharmas that directly hinders [the attainment] of the two kinds of emptiness. How does one realize the two kinds of emptiness, and thoroughly remove the remaining hindrances? Hence this explanation.
二執爲本、貪等具生。故隨證空、餘障通斷。 [測云] 法執雖遍、今約相別、煩惱障說。 [樞要云] 安慧宗不說五八有衆生執、及說第七唯有生執。若第六七煩惱名重、計執深故、五識中輕、由他引故、無生執故。若所知障、第六名重、解深廣故。五八名輕、計執淺故。是則由重輕障具生、證空斷重、餘輕隨滅。 [諸家繁釋、皆歸此義。]
Craving and so forth arise in concert, based on the two kinds of attachment. Therefore, according to one’s realization of emptiness, the other hindrances are thoroughly eliminated. [Woncheuk says:] Even though attachment to dharmas is pervasive, now, distinguishing according to their characteristics, the afflictive hindrances are explained. [The Shuyao says:] The school of Sthiramati does not teach that the five [sense] consciousnesses and eighth consciousness 78 have attachment to sentient-beinghood, positing instead that only the seventh (manas) consciousness has attachment to beinghood. When the afflictions in the sixth and seventh consciousnesses are said to be heavy, it is because their attachment to the imaginary is deep. Those within the five [sense] consciousnesses are light, because they are drawn in from other things (i.e., external objects, etc.), and because they lack attachment to beinghood. In the case of cognitive hindrances, those in the sixth consciousness are said to be heavy, since intelligence [in that consciousness functions] deeply and broadly. Those in the five sense consciousnesses and the eighth consciousness are said to be light, since attachment to the imaginary [in those consciousnesses] is shallow. Thus, since heavy and light hindrances arise concurrently, one realizes emptiness and eliminates the heavy, while the remaining light hindrances are extinguished according to the situation. [While the interpretations of the various scholars are at variance on all sorts of points, they all agree on this.]
或說現行名輕、種習名重。隨重生斷。准前應知、前說爲 79 善。執障倶有現種、如何種習名重、現行名輕。故前爲勝。
Some explain active hindrances to be light, while seeds and habit energies (i.e., their latent aspects) are heavy. 80 They are counteracted according to their heaviness. One should be able to understand this according to the prior explanation, and so the prior explanation is taken as good. The attachments and the hindrances both have active and seed (i.e., latent) aspects. So how is it that seeds and habit energies are called heavy, and manifest activity is called light? Therefore the prior explanation is better.
The [Shuyao] also says: “Objection: in the nine classes 81 [of hindrances] in the two vehicles, the prior eight only [remove] the hindrances, but have not yet eliminated the view of self. How do they cut off the arising of the remaining hindrances according to attachment?” A further objection: “Sthiramati says that except for the seventh consciousness, all the rest have attachment to dharmas. How is it that one is able to remove the complicit afflictions at the fifth stage, whereas those removed at the sixth and seventh stages are all said to be feeble?” 82
Resolution: The first objection only discusses the hindrances through their arising from attachment; when attachment is eliminated, the hindrances disappear. It does not say that in the hindrances as derivatives disappear and that all are eliminated according to the root of attachment. The latter objection is resolved by saying that even though all [contaminated states of mind] have attachment to dharmas, since there are roots and derivatives, it is not the case that the [simultaneously arisen hindrances] are simultaneously [eliminated in the] fourth ground, those produced by direct influence are called complicit, and the distantly produced are called feeble. 83 This is because passing through the complicit and so forth only clarifies the afflictions, and is not applicable to the cognitive hindrances. Their distribution into the three transformations of the basis and so forth is an unnecessary complication. 84
Once the hindrances are eliminated you can attain the two excellent realizations (of liberation and enlightenment). Based on the cutting off of the continuity of rebirth in the form of the afflictive hindrances, one realizes true liberation. Based on the elimination of the cognitive hindrances that obstruct understanding, you attain great enlightenment.
述曰。第三得果。標釋應知。言勝果者 [測云] 四句。一勝而非果、菩薩智斷。二果而非勝、羅漢智斷。三亦勝亦果、卽佛二果。四非勝非果、異生有學。簡餘三句、故言勝果。
Explanation: The third part is the attainment of realization. The indications of the explanation should be known. Regarding the words “excellent” and “realizations,” [according to Woncheuk] there are four [ways they are aligned]: (1) excellent without realization—the wisdom and elimination of bodhisattvas; (2) realization without excellence—the wisdom and elimination of arhats; (3) excellent and also realization—i.e., the two realizations of Buddhahood; (4) neither excellent nor realization—the unenlightened and those still in training. 85 Omitting the other three alignments, they are called “excellent realizations.”
How is that both of the Buddha-realizations are called “excellent”? The Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra says: “The liberation of the three vehicles is the same.” 86 The Sūtra on the Primary Activities of Bodhisattvas 87 says: “The adamantine [stage] is called virtual enlightenment; 88 understand that [destruction of defilements] through analysis is the same in essence.” Since the ability to realize is excellent, it is like the path of non-abiding revealing the excellence of non-abiding. When the adherents of the two vehicles attain [nirvāṇa with] remainder, it is because they are not free from active suffering; once they experience [nirvāṇa with] no remainder, they are forever gone from the world because they are able to realize wisdom. It is as the *Mahāyānâvatāra says: “The liberation of the Tathāgata surpasses that of the two vehicles, because he eliminates [the remaining] habit energies.” 89
As far as “virtual enlightenment” is concerned, one part of the meaning is that of equality, based on the fact that true wisdom is equal to that of the buddhas, but conventional wisdom is weak. Xuanzang says: “The instantaneous [path] 90 and the liberation [path] 91 sever virtually the same hindrance, therefore the word ‘virtual.’ It should not be interpreted as ‘equal.’ ” 92
涅槃經第二十五末云、「佛名明見佛性。十住菩薩未見佛性、故不了了。」 瑜伽五十「等覺妙覺有優劣故。」 [斷是傍用。何名等覺。如實之義、如本母釋。]
At the end of the twenty-fifth fascicle of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra it says: “Buddha is a word expressing a vision of the Buddha-nature. Since the bodhisattvas in the ten abodes have not yet seen the Buddha-nature, their realization is not perfectly complete.” 93 In fascicle fifty of the Yogâcārabhūmi-śāstra it says: “Because virtual enlightenment and marvelous enlightenment 94 are superior and inferior.” 95 [Elimination is a secondary function. Why is it called virtual enlightenment? The real meaning is as given in the explanation of the source text.]
As for “true liberation,” there is liberation that is not true, such as the “that-part nirvāṇa” 96 attained by quelling. There is truth that is not liberation, as is the case of the thusness of the two kinds of emptiness, 97 which do not constitute the completion of the path. There is truth that is also liberation, such as the nirvāṇa of the three vehicles, which is permanently freed from binding. There is also the case where both are untrue, which lie outside of the above three. Selecting the remaining three cases is called true liberation. As for “great bodhi,” there is the case of it’s being great but not being bodhi, such as the accurate cognition of the bodhisattvas in the level of worldly sages. There it is the case having bodhi that is not great, such as the holy cognitive abilities of the arhats. Then there is the case of greatness and bodhi together, which is the wisdom of the Tathāgata. There is also the case where it is neither great nor bodhi, as in the case of the wisdom of worldlings and sages-in-training of the two vehicles. From the perspective of reality of the two hindrances, both hindrances obstruct wisdom and elimination. Here, focusing on their most prominent aspects, each of the two hindrances specifically obstructs either wisdom or elimination. 98
又、爲開示謬執我法、迷唯識者、令達二空、於唯識理、如 99 實知故。
Furthermore, [Vasubandhu composed the Treatise] to instruct those who are mistakenly attached to a self and dharmas and who are confused about Consciousness-only, to permit them to realize the two kinds of emptiness and truly comprehend the principle of Consciousness-only.
述曰。卽第二節。斷執證空、悟唯識相。前以三意、今以二意。令得眞俗二智慧故、 [基云] 爲初業開、爲久業示。且、外道中別計我者、謂數論等諸離蘊計、別計法者、二十五諦六句等也。 [卽蘊計等應於此攝] 內道之中別計我者、宗輪論云、「犢子部、幷根本經部、正量部等、皆執有我。」 別執法者、如薩婆多化地部等。 [惡取空等應此中攝] 此內外道、迷眞俗性。爲外道開、爲內道示。令眞智達眞唯識性、於唯識相、後智知故。
Explanation: This is the second section. Eliminating attachment, one realizes emptiness, and awakens to the characteristics of Consciousness-only. Earlier this was expressed with three connotations, but here it is expressed with two. Since they are caused to attain the two kinds of sapience of real and conventional [Kuiji says] they are disclosed in initial activity, and directly shown in enduring activity. Now, among the non-Buddhists, there is the imagination of the distinct, separate self; i.e., the Sāṃkhyas 100 and so forth imagine a self apart from the aggregates, or imagine distinct dharmas, as in the twenty-five elements [of the Sāṃkhyas] and the six essences [posited by the Vaiśeṣikas 101 ]. [This means that imagination within the aggregates should also be included here.] Regarding the separate imagination of the self within Buddhism 102 the Cycle of the Formation of the Schismatic Doctrines 103 says: “The Vātsīputrīyas, 104 Sautrāntikas, 105 Sāṃmitīya, 106 etc., all attach to the existence of a self.” 107 Those who attach to dharmas are the Sarvâstivādins, 108 Mahīśāsakas, 109 and so forth. [Erroneous attachment to emptiness should also be included here.] These Buddhists and non-Buddhists confuse the natures of the real and the conventional. These problems are opened up by the non-Buddhists, and discussed by the Buddhists. Now, using accurate cognition, we penetrate to the true nature of Consciousness-only, and the characteristics of Consciousness-only are known by subsequently-attained cognition. 110
問。犢子羅漢何起我見。測云、「三藏解云、‘未得羅漢起此計故、却談 111 前故。’ 說彼部計、經部等亦爾、本外道故。或說彼部弟子所計、非外道時。如倶舍論。彼部救云、‘我部不誦破我經故。’ 和上云、‘雖得羅漢、昔與我見同體法執。由習氣强、起如是執。’」
Question: How is it that the Vātsīputrīyas [say that the] arhat gives rise to a view of self? Woncheuk says: “The Trepiṭaka explained, saying: ‘They made this assumption before attaining arhatship, and before this discussion had been disposed of.’ 112 It is said that that school makes this imputation, and the Sautrāntikas do the same thing, since they are originally non-Buddhists. Some say that the imputations of the followers of that school are derived from the time when they were non-Buddhists. As the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya, 113 in its inquiry of that school, says: ‘It is because our [Vātsīputrīya] school did not read scriptures that refute the self.’ 114 The Venerable Teacher says: ‘Even though they attain arhatship, in the past, in addition to the view of self they embodied attachment to dharmas. Because their habituation is strong, they give rise to this kind of attachment.’ ”
There is also confusion about the principle of Consciousness-only. Some grasp the external world as not non-existent, like consciousness.
Explanation: This is the third section. Refuting mistaken attachments, one gives rise to accurate understanding. Within this there are two parts: the first shows the four imputations, and the second shows the formation of wrong attachments. As for the four imputations, the first is that seen in the Sarvâstivādins and so forth, who attach to external objects as if they really exist in the same way as the mind.
基師量云、「我離心境決定實有。許除異竟無、 115 心境二法隨一攝、故如心心所。」 [有不定過。除無、心境隨一攝故。爲如心心等、定實有耶。爲如甁等、非實有餘耶? 過、不用。]
The inference [as provided by] Kuiji, [expressing the Sarvâstivāda view,] says:
[Thesis:] Objects definitely exist apart from the mind.
[Reason:] If we allow for the denial of their absolute non-existence, the two dharmas of mind and objects are subsumed into one.
[Example:] Therefore they are like the mind and mental functions. 116 [Here there is a fallacy of inconclusiveness. 117 Their non-existence is rejected based on the mind and objects being subsumed into one, and taking this to be like the mind and mental factors and so forth. But are the mind and mental factors definitely truly existent? In the case of vases and so forth, is not “real existence” something else? Since it is fallacious, it can’t be used.]
測師量云、「外境非無、能所取中隨一攝故。如論主內識 118 。」 [比 119 量二過。一自他亂。有法外境、卽自比量。同喩論主、卽他比量。不可一量。或自或他。何者若純他法。卽自所無自比量中、無同喩過。故喩中言論主無用。二、不定過。對薩婆多、雖此無過、全部等許緣無生心故。]
The inference offered by Woncheuk says:
[Thesis:] External objects are not non-existent.
[Reason:] Because grasper (grāhaka) and grasped (grāhya) are subsumed together in between.
[Example:] It is like the internal consciousness set forth in this treatise [the CWSL]. 120
This argument contains two fallacies: the first is that of confusion of one’s own position with that of the discussant. Arguing for the existence of such a thing as an external object is “offering one’s own reasoning.” 121 The example used is that of an assertion by the treatise, which is “using the opponent’s reasoning.” They can’t comprise the same inference—it has to be either be one’s own or the discussant’s. What if we simply rely on the other’s thesis? Because, since it is lacking in one’s own inference, there will be a fallacy of a missing example. Therefore the words of the example “the treatise asserts” are inapplicable. The second is a fallacy of inconclusiveness. This is because even if it is not fallacious to a Sarvâstivādin, all of the schools 122 generally see an unborn mind.
(Hui) Guan says: “If this example of internal consciousness is to be applied to the proof of one’s own thesis, an internal consciousness aside from objects will not be accepted by the author of the treatise. Since the discussant follows the same example, neither is conclusive.” [If both allow that consciousness exists, the same example can be used. Yet in the case where there is a fallacy of appearing similar but being different in the example, 123 it does not suffice for dialog, and thus in the end we cannot accept this kind of confused explanation.]
證師量云。「如我所說、外境非無。計除無法、能所取中隨一攝故。如論主內識。」 [今謂比 124 量雖無不定、然有如前自他亂失。共許內識、旣有體法。但諍彼境有外無外、何勞內識分別自他。]
Dojeung argues: “According to my position,
[Thesis:] External objects are not non-existent.
[Reason:] Because when imputation is removed there are no dharmas, and thus grasper and grasped are absorbed as one into the middle.
[Example:] It is like the inner consciousness [proposed by] the treatise author. [Now even though this inference is not inconclusive, it still has the same problem of confusion of the arguments for oneself and for the discussant as in the previous case. With both sides allowing for an inner consciousness, there are already substantial dharmas. However, in debating as to whether or not the objects exist externally, through what process can one distinguish the [understanding of] inner consciousness to be one’s own or the discussants’?]
Question: If, leaving aside the words of the author, we are able to prove this inference, how will the Mahāyānists refute this mistaken attachment? Dojeung says: “Along with being contradictory because of differences with the premise, 125 it is contradictory because of an internal fallacy.”
[Thesis:] You say that external objects are not separate from consciousness and not non-existent.
[Reason:] Because, if you allow the rejection of subjective dharmas, the subjective and objective are subsumed as one in the middle.
[Example:] It is like the internal consciousness contradicting the thought that resides in that dharma.
If you allow for the difference, the word “consciousness” in the thesis also includes mental factors, therefore there is no inconclusiveness. [There is also a fallacy of contradicting expressed-subject. 126 This is because this can also not prove the nature of external objects. Subsequently one only grasps to this type, enjoying literal explication, with bogus explication. It is the proliferation of empty chatter.]
혹은 내부의 식이 외부대상처럼 존재하지 않는다고 집착한다.
Some grasp internal consciousness as non-existent, like external objects.
설명한다. 이것은 두 번째 계탁(計度)이다.
述曰。此第二計。基云、「淸辨等師、說諸法空、便撥心體。」 量云、「汝說內識如境非有。許所知故。如汝外境。」 [他比量故、有法及喩、竝云汝也。宗言如境、量言無用、但可宗言識非有。]
Explanation: This is the second assumption. Kuiji says: “Scholars like Bhāvaviveka teach the emptiness of all dharmas, directly denying the substance of the mind.” 127 Inference:
[Thesis:] You say that internal consciousness, like objects, do not exist.
[Reason:] You allow for knowables.
[Example] They are like your external objects. [Since this is the other’s inference, the factual base 128 and the example both say “you.” The thesis says “like objects.” The word “inference” has no function, except to allow the proposition to say that consciousness does not exist.]
證云、「因有自他倶三不定。如我眞如、則他不定。如汝俗心境、卽自不定。如汝俗諦、許有眞如、我亦許有、則倶不定。」 [旣他比故、唯他不定。必無他比、作自不定。又、俗於眞不能不定、故共不定、亦不應理。謂就勝義、疑空不空、方成不定。世俗門有旣非眞有、有不相關 129 故。謂且破云、「許所知故。爲如外境勝義空耶。爲如心境世俗有耶。」 彼必答言、「如俗心境勝義唯空、無不定故。」]
Dojeung says: “[The rules of] logic include the three kinds of inconclusiveness of one’s own inference, the opponent’s inference, and inference accepted by both. It is like thusness for me, which is inconclusive for the adversary. It is like conventional mental objects for you, which are inconclusive for me. It is like the conventional truth asserted by you, which admits the existence of thusness; since I also admit it, then there is inconclusiveness on both sides.” [Since this is the opponent’s inference, it is only inconclusive for the opponent. To be inconclusive for oneself it is necessary that there be no inference from the opponent. Furthermore, the conventional regarding the real cannot be inconclusive, therefore both being inconclusive doesn’t make sense. This means that it is from the perspective of the ultimate truth that one doubts emptiness and non-emptiness, which results in inconclusiveness. From the perspective of conventional reality, existence is already not true existence, since it has no mutual relationship with existence. This means that this is now refuted, by saying: “Since you admit of knowables, does this mean that they are like external objects, which are empty from the perspective of the ultimate truth? Or does it mean that they are like mind and objects that are existent from the perspective of the conventional truth?” He must answer, saying: “Inasmuch as conventional mind and objects are ultimately only empty, there is no inconclusiveness.”]
測師量云、「內識非有、能所取中隨一攝故。猶如外境。」 [宗義云何。若空無者、聖教相違。般若說無不了義故。若空非無、立已成過。此若他比、亦以眞如有他不定。若共亦爾。前 130 說共比、自法皆不定故。]
The inference of Woncheuk says:
[Thesis:] Internal consciousness does not exist.
[Reason:] Because grasper and grasped are subsumed into one in the middle.
[Example:] Just like external objects. [What is the content of the thesis? If it is non-existent, it is at odds with scriptural authority, since the prajñā teaching of non-existence is an incompletely revealed doctrine. If emptiness is not non-existent, then what is being posited is already fallacious. If this is the opponent’s inference, since one also takes thusness as existent, there is inconclusiveness in the other’s position. It is the same in the case of shared inference. This is because he has previously stated a shared inference, the properties of which on both sides are all inconclusive.]
三藏又解、「淸辨立相、而不立見。且如眼識緣靑等時心。卽是離靑等, 外無別能緣、乃至證眞空。外無智。雖於世俗心境倶有、境實心虛、從實唯境。如唯識師攝相歸心。」 [彼意眞智證眞如時、智虛歸境。餘心亦然。心行似境、境不似心。明知心虛隨境改轉。不可說言由心縛解。心與境本、勿心由慧亦縛亦脫, 慧爲王故。雖未而利能引道故、名依世俗。五識非有、世間相無勞餘過。]
The Trepiṭaka also explains:
Bhāvaviveka posits the objective part [of consciousness], 131 but does not posit the subjective part. 132 It is like the mind when the visual consciousness apprehends a blue color and so forth. If it is separated from the blue color and so forth, then externally there is nothing special to be apprehended, [which holds true] up to the case of [accurate cognition] witnessing [the principle] of emptiness. [All there is, is true emptiness, and aside from emptiness there is no distinguishable ability] such as accurate cognition. Even though from the conventional standpoint mind and objects both exist, objects are real and the mind is void. In truth there are only objects. 133 It is like the Consciousness-only masters gathering in marks and returning them to mind. [This means that when accurate cognition witnesses thusness, cognition is void and relies on objects. It is the same with other states of mind. Mental functions resemble objects, but the objects do not resemble mind. Thus it is obvious that the mind is void, and comes into appearance according to its objects. You can’t say that it is based on the mind that one is bound or liberated. The mind is based on the objects; it is not that the mind is bound or liberated according to wisdom, and thus wisdom is the ruler. Even though this has not yet come to be, one’s sharpness is sufficient to avail oneself to the way, and thus it is named based on worldly convention. The five consciousnesses do not exist, and from the mundane perspective, there is no concern over other errors.]
Some grasp the various kinds of consciousness as differing in function but being the same in essence.
Explanation: This is the third imputation. 134 The Mahāyāna-saṃgrāha says: “There is one group of scholars that says there is one consciousness, based on which there are various transformations, to which are applied various names, such as the activities of mentation and thought.” 135 The Commentary says: “One group of bodhisattvas takes three scriptures as authorities. The first is the Dharma Leg Sūtra, 136 since the mind is distantly removed and functioning independently. 137 The second is the Sūtra on the Production of Consciousness from the Five Faculties, since in the sphere of activity of the five faculties, each consciousness is able to receive (sense data). Third is the Sūtra of the Twelve Fields, since the six consciousnesses are subsumed in the conceptualizing consciousness.” 138
測云、「但說六識爲一意識、不說七八、亦無別體。」 世親釋云、「非離意識、別有餘識。唯除別有阿賴耶。」 139 故。准知七亦有別體。然第八識、依執五根、恐濫六識、故別簡取。
Woncheuk says: “This is simply saying that the six consciousnesses are subsumed in the one conceptualizing consciousness (sixth consciousness). It does not discuss the seventh and eighth consciousnesses; there is also no separate essence.” The explanation by Vasubandhu (in the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha-bhāṣya) says: “There is, apart from the thinking consciousness, no separately existing other consciousness. The only exception is the separately existing ālayavijñāna.” From this we can surmise that the seventh consciousness also has a distinct essence. Yet the eighth consciousness adheres to the five faculties. For fear that it might be confused with the sixth consciousness, it is separately distinguished.
Dojeung says: “The [line in the] Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra’s chapter on the characteristics of the mind, mentation, and conceptualizing consciousnesses says: ‘This only explains that the six consciousnesses up to the ādāna are a single consciousness.’ 140 Since this master originally did not believe in the existence of the manas, 141 only the eighth consciousness was singled out. These sentences together refute the position of the author of the Satyasiddhi-śāstra. 142 There in the eighth fascicle, 143 he says: ‘The monkey leaps around within the cave of the five sense organs’ ” (T 1646.32.278c16) .
혹은 심왕(心王)을 떠나 다른 심소(心所)가 없다고 집착한다.
Some believe that there are no separate mental functions apart from the mind itself.
설명한다. 네 번째 계탁이다.
Explanation: This is the fourth imputation.
測云、「破覺天義。如毘婆娑百四十二云、‘尊者覺天作如是說。諸有爲法、有二自性。一大種、二心。謂離大種無所造色、離心無別心所。諸色皆是大種差別、無色皆是心之差別。’ 或經部宗有二。如正理十一云、‘有譬喩者、說唯有心、無別心所。’」 [同覺天義、說士夫六界故, 染淨由心故。] 執有心所、多興諍論。或說唯三、謂受、相、思。 [經說五蘊故。] 或說有四、加觸。或說有十、謂十大地。或說十四、加貪、瞋、癡、慢。今隨應破彼彼所所無。
Woncheuk says: “This refutes the position of Buddhadeva. 144 As it says in section 142 of the Mahāvibhāṣā: 145 ‘The theory of the Venerable Buddhadeva asserts that conditioned dharmas have two kinds of own-natures: that of the physical elements and that of mind. This means that apart from the [four] physical elements 146 there are no material things, and apart from mind there are no mental functions. All material things are nothing but variations of the physical elements, and all non-material thing are nothing but variations of the mind.’ 147 Within the Sautrāntikas there are sometimes two views. As it says in the eleventh section of the Abhidharma-nyāyânusāra-śāstra: 148 ‘There are Dārṣṭāntikas who say that there is only mind, and no separate mental functions.’ 149 ” [This is the same as the understanding of Buddhadeva, who says that the six realms 150 of living beings, and purity and pollution are based on mind. 151 ] For those attached to the notion of existence of mental functions, many related debates arise. Some say that there are only three [mental functions], namely sensation, perception, and thought. [This is because the sūtras teach the five aggregates.] Some say there are four, adding contact. Others say there are ten, namely the ten pervasive mental factors (of Abhidharma). Still others advocate fourteen, adding [to the prior ten] craving, ill-will, folly, and pride. Now here there will be an appropriate refutation of this and that position of the existence and non-existence of the mental functions.
This treatise was composed in order to refute these various mistaken attachments and to allow people to acquire a correct understanding of the profound and wonderful principle of Consciousness-only.
Explanation: This second section extensively settles mistaken attachments. Above, the four assumptions were introduced. Now, these positions are explained in the order of Hīnayāna, Mahāyāna; Mahāyāna, Hīnayāna.
然、樞要云、「竝通大小。第一、大乘、謂淸辨宗 依世俗諦心外有境。第二、小乘一說部、執一切諸法、唯有假名。第三、小乘成實論主、卽攝論云、‘心意識一。’ 第四、大乘、依莊嚴論、執唯心似貪等似信等。皆如次第、執境、執心、非空、非有、執心、執所、非多、非異。」
Now, the Shuyao says:
If we juxtapose the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, first is the Mahāyāna, namely the school of Bhāvaviveka, which, relying on the conventional truth [says that] there are objects outside of the mind. Second are the Hīnayānist Sarvâstivāda, who adhere to the position that all dharmas only exist nominally. Third are the Satyasiddhi, regarding whom the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: “Mind, thought, and cognition are one.” Fourth is the Mahāyāna as interpreted in the Mahāyāna-sūtrâlaṃkāra, which adheres to the position that there is only mind, which seems to crave, believe, and so forth. All, in order, attach to objects and attach to mind; deny emptiness and deny existence; attach to mind and attach to its functions; deny plurality and deny difference. 152
疏執境心、四句分別、「淸辨順世、有境無心。 [順世云 「法皆大種」故。] 中道大乘、有心無境。薩婆多等、有境有心。邪見一說、無境無心。」 擧此等取外道諸見、故言此等種種異執。
The various attachments to objects and mind can be distinguished into four. “Bhāvaviveka and the Lokâyatika 153 say that there are objects and no mind. [The Lokâyatika say: “Dharmas are all material elements.”] In the middle path of the Mahāyāna, there is mind, but no objects. The Sarvâstivāda and others say that there are both objects and mind. One theory of those of erroneous view is that there are neither objects nor mind.” 154 In addition to these, people attach to the various views of non-Buddhists; therefore these are called various kinds of mistaken attachments.
In the beginning of the prologue it says “I will now write this treatise,” and in the end it says “Therefore I write this treatise.” One by one, in all we have passed through three stages in this prologue.
If nothing exists but consciousness, why do both ordinary people and the holy teachings say that selves and dharmas exist?
Explanation: Second is the teaching proper, for which there is original text and exegesis; through the exegesis we can follow the text.
The text [of the Triṃśikā] has three parts. The first consists of the twenty-five verses, which elucidate the object of Consciousness-only; the next consists of four verses, which elucidate the practice of Consciousness-only; the final one verse elucidates the effect of Consciousness-only.
The first section can be divided further into three. The first one and a half lines of verse reveal the tenets by showing their substance; the second explains in detail the teachings of Consciousness-only; the third explains concisely the objections of the non-Buddhists. The first section also has two parts; the former raises the issue with a question; the latter gives a proper answer offering a verse. As for the first, according to the Yogâcārabhūmi-śāstra-kārikā: 155 “Among the five kinds of questions, this is the fifth, the asking of a question in order to bring benefit and joy to sentient beings.” 156
Kuiji says: “This treatise has already taken Consciousness-only as its main tenet (T 1830.43.230b5) . How could it not be at odds with common sense or scriptural authority? Since self and dharmas are originally non-existent, they are like the horns of a rabbit and so forth, so without reason they produce various theories.” 157
The first verse and the first half of the second verse of the Triṃśikā:
由假說我法 有種種相轉 彼依識所變
此能變唯三 謂異熟思量 及了別境識
From the nominally designated self and dharmas,
Various and sundry things come into appearance.
These are all based on the transformations of consciousness.
The transforming consciousness is threefold: 158
Namely, retribution, 159 assessing,
and the cognition of objects. 160
Explanation: In this second part a verse is offered as the answer proper. Within there are two parts—the verse and the explanation. In this first part, within the verse there are two. In the first there are three phrases, which address the objections and reveal the central tenet. The three subsequent phrases briefly show the essential nature. “These” means self and dharmas; “consciousness” is their essence. “Those that are transformed” are the objective and subjective parts of consciousness. “This subjective transformation” is the subjective transformation of the objective and subjective parts of consciousness. This essence is none other than the subjective transformer. The second, the explanation, is complete. In saying “there are only three,” it is like the below object of transformation. Even though there are limitless kinds, subjective transformation is subsumed in three types.
The treatise says, ordinary discourse and scriptural authority say that selves and dharmas exist. But since they are only nominally posited, they have no true essence. “Self” means “director” and “cutter.” 161 “Dharma” means “pattern” and “maintenance.” 162
Explanation: There are two parts to the explication of the verse. The first explains the first three phrases, resolving objections and pointing out the tenets. After the phrase “even though the transformations of consciousness are of innumerable kinds,” it explains the following three phrases, showing the characteristics of subjective transformation. In the first there are also two parts: the explanation of the verses and the extensive refutation of the attachments of non-Buddhists. In the explanation proper there are three: the first explains the [first] two lines of verse; the next explains the third; the last deals with various aspects. This is the first line of the verse.
As for “from the nominally designated,” the self and dharmas that are attached to are non-existent, and so they are not on the outside. There seems to be a self and there seem to be dharmas: since they are consciousness they are not on the outside. Apart from consciousness there is nothing substantial; therefore they are said to be nominally designated. “Self” has two meanings: “independent” and “cutting up.” Since it is independent, it is called “master.” Since it cuts things into pieces, it is called “cutter.” Dharma has two meanings: “producing understanding” and “maintaining a distinctive character.” Since it causes people to give rise to understanding it is called “pattern.” Since it is able to maintain self-nature, it is called “maintainer.” Each one of these fully includes all selves and dharmas.
測云、「瑜伽五十二、‘有持有義、無持無義。竝能生心、皆名爲法。’明知一切具軌持義。」 基云、「軌唯有法、持通無法。」 云云非也、亦能生心解故。
In fascicle fifty-two of the Yogâcārabhūmi it says: “ ‘Existence’ refers to the establishment of the existent, and the support of the existent. ‘Non-existence’ refers to the establishment of the non-existent and the support of the non-existent. Both give rise to thought and are all called dharmas.” 163 This makes it clear that all fully include the meaning of pattern and support.Kuiji says: “[The meaning of] ‘pattern’ only applies in the case of existent dharmas. The meaning of ‘maintaining’ additionally applies in the case of non-existent dharmas” 164 and so forth. When this is rejected, it is also because they are able to produce understanding in the mind.
Master Guan supports this, saying: “If one produces intimate understanding, it is nothing but reflected images.” 165 Raw substance is not lacking in patterns. When there is awareness without perceptual objects, it is from the raw substance that one produces understanding, not from reflected images. As the World Honored One said: “My holy disciples: [if the dharma] exists, accurate knowing exists; [if the dharma] does not exist, accurate knowing does not exist.” 166
These two take different forms. Various forms of selves include such things as “sentient being” and “living being,” and such things as “stream-winner” and “once returner.” 167 Various forms of dharmas are such things as “substance,” “quality,” “activity” (karma), 168 “aggregates” (skandha), “sense bases” (āyatana), and “sense fields” (dhātu). “Comes forth” means that these distinctions occur in accordance with conditions. 169
Explanation: I will explain the first two phrases. “Sentient being” and “living being” are mundane forms of self. “Stream-winner” and “once-returner” are holy forms of self. Substance, quality, activity, and so forth are mundane forms of dharmas; the aggregates, bases, fields, and so forth are holy forms of dharmas. This means that both erroneous thinking and correct thinking according to their own approaches, with distinction as their condition, establish the various synonyms of sentient being and so forth. It is like puruṣa, 170 since it has feelings and consciousness, and since it has life. Or it is like nominal designations, since they are included in the category of the holy, and since they leave behind a single existence. In this way, with erroneous and correct doctrines as conditions, the various aspects of self and dharmas are provisionally established.
If these forms are all derived as nominal designations, how are they established? These forms are all nominal designations based on the transformations of consciousness.
Explanation: This treats the third line of verse. First is a question and next is an answer. If selves and dharmas are all nominal designations, the nominal must have some reality as its basis, thus the question of what the basis is. The answer has two parts, the first being the general answer. Woncheuk says: “Depending of the transformations of consciousness, the objective and subjective parts are established.” Kuiji says: “They are pervasively established based on the self-witnessing that comes forth from the seeds.”
“Consciousness” means “cognition.” Here, in the treatise, the word “consciousness” also includes mental functions, because they are definitely associated with the former.
Explanation: Next is the specific answer, which has two parts: consciousness and transformation. As for the first, “cognition” 了 refers to the function of the eight consciousnesses in cognizing objects. As the Twenty Verses on Consciousness-only 171 says: “Mind, mentation, and cognition—[these are] distinctions in name.” 172
Non-Buddhists object [saying that] mental functions are not transformations of consciousness—how could something like form also be nothing but consciousness? This can be resolved by saying: The reason that this subjectively transforming nature of consciousness is said to be subsumed is because it is definitely concomitant. This means that the transformation of the object of each mental function hides its weakness and shows its strengths. It does not say “only [mental] functions.”
“Transformation” means that the substance of consciousness seems to come forth in two parts. 173 Because these subjective and objective parts together serve as the basis for the arising of the self-witnessing part, depending on these two parts, self and dharmas are nominally established. This is because, without these two parts, these [self and dharmas] would have no basis.
Explanation: Next is the explanation of “transformation,” which has two parts. The first has three subparts, and the second has in turn two subparts. Concerning the first, the Trepiṭaka said: “Sthiramati only posited the self-witnessing part; Citrabhāna and Bandhuśri 174 only posited the objective and subjective parts.” Beyond these three, other scholars shared in their explanation. Even though Dharmapāla and Bandhuprabha posited the four parts of cognition, for a time they relied on this shared agreement. The third part of Dignāga’s tripartite system includes the fourth part [posited by Dharmapāla et al.].
基云、「說相見種或同或異。若同種者、卽一識體轉似相見二分而生、如一蝸牛變生二角。若別種者、體轉似見、轉相分種、亦似相起。計非實故立似名。相別有種、何名識變。由心分別、相方生故。」 [旣二依自證、明知相分體。依分證、起相狀現於見。] 然三法種。樞要云、「護法正義質顯見三、三性種子繫未必同。隨所應故。」
Kuiji says: “In some explanations of the objective and subjective aspects they are of the same type, and in some they are different. In the case where they are of the same type, then the substance of one instance of cognition is produced while seeming to bifurcate into the objective and subjective aspects, just like a snail generating two horns. 175 In the case where they are different in type, the substance [of an instance of cognition] comes forth seeming to be the subjective part, which generates the objective part, which also arises seeming to be objective. . . . Since they are imputed and not real, they are established as pseudonyms. Since the objective part is distinguished as a separate seed, how can it be called a ‘transformation of consciousness’? It is because it appears based on mental discriminations.” 176 [Since the two depend on self-witnessing, we clearly know the substance of the objective aspect. Depending on the partitioning of the witnessing, there arises the objective aspect that appears to the subjective aspect.] Yet regarding these three types of phenomena, the Shuyao says: “In the orthodox interpretation of Dharmapāla, [the two objective aspects of] raw sensate matter and appearances, along with subjective aspect, make three. The binding of these three seed-natures are not necessarily the same, because they follow as appropriate. 177 ”
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Sin Hyeonsuk. “Dang Gyugi wa Silla Woncheuk ui sangwi seolgu.” Hanguk bulgyo hak 4 Hanguk bulgyo hakhoe (1979):
Songfu. Dazhou ximingsi gudade Yuance fashi fo sheli taming. XZJ 1651–10
Tagawa Shun’ei. Living Yogācāra: An Introduction to Consciousness-only Buddhism. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2009.
Tsukamoto, Keishō, and Charles Willemen, trans. The Treatise on the Elucidation of the Knowable: The Cycle of the Formation of the Schismatic Doctrines. Berkeley: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, 2004.
Wayman, Alex. A Millennium of Buddhist Logic. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1999.
Wayman, Alex, and Hideko Wayman, trans. The Lion’s Roar of Queen Śrīmālā. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974.
Won Uibeom. “Woncheuk ui yusik sasang.” Sungsan Bak Giljin baksa hwagap ginyeom: Hanguk bulgyo sasang sa. Won bulgyo sasang yeon-gu won, 1975.
Yoshimura Makoto. “Tō shoki ni okeru gosh ō kakubetsu setsu ni tsuite.” Nihon bukkyō gakkai nenpō. (2000):
Yoshizu Yoshihide. “Taiken no Jō yuishiki ron gakki wo megutte.” Indogaku bukkyōgaku kenkyū 41-1 (1992):
----. “Taiken no Jō yuishiki ron gakki Kenshū dan no chūshakuteki kenkyū.” Han Gidu baksa hwagap ginyeom: Hanguk jonggyo sasang ui jae jomyeong 상, Wongwang daehakkyo chulpan, 1993.
Shigeki Moro has written a couple of useful articles on the Hakgi, which are available at: http://moromoro.jp/morosiki/resources/20041024.html and http://moromoro.jp/morosiki/resources/20040530.html.
1. This introduction is translated from the introduction to the Korean version
2. Most Japanese records list his name as 太賢, but since most documents in the Silla and Goryeo use 大賢, we will follow this practice here.
3. Chae Inhwan, “Silla Taehyeon beopsa yeon-gu,” pp. 3–20.
4. During the course of this translation virtually all Sino-Korean terms, person names, and text names have been added to the Digital Dictionary of Buddhism and can thus be further investigated online at http://www.buddhism-dict.net/ddb.
5. See Bang In, “Taehyeon ui yusik cheolhak yeon-gu,S” pp. 36–41.
6. See Yoshizu Yoshihide 吉津宜英, “Taiken no Jō yuishiki ron gakki kenshū dan no chūshakuteki kenkyū,” pp. 9–13.
7. See I Man, Silla Taehyeon ui yusik sasang yeon-gu—Seong yusingnon hakgi rul jungin uro, pp. 26–35.
8. The Hakgi apparently may have also originally been entitled Gojeokgi, as is noted in the third fascicle of Daehyeon’s Bosal jang abidalma gojeokgi 菩薩藏阿毘達摩古迹記. However, the name hakgi can also be seen in a number of other works. See Gim Yeongtae, Hanguk bulgyo gojeon myeongjeo ui segye, p. 139.
9. See Yoshizu Yoshihide, “Taiken no Jō yuishiki ron gakki wo megutte,” pp. 118–119.
10. I Man, Silla Taehyeon, pp. 104–145
11. Compare Daehyeon’s arrangement of the CWSL is compared with Kuiji’s:
12. I Man, Silla Taehyeon, pp. 131–145.
13. There were two versions: a six-fascicle version and a ten-fascicle version. Since the terms “beginning, middle, and end” are used to describe this work, we are assuming that there is a greater probability that it was the six fascicle version, divided into two-fascicle units.
14. 淸辯: Also known as Bhavya, ca. 490–570. An influential Madhyamaka scholar, originally from South India, who went to Magadha to study the Middle Way teachings of Nāgârjuna and Saṃgharakṣita. He was known for his usage of positive dialectic to support the theory of emptiness. In this he was distinguished from philosophical opponents such as Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti, both of whom denied the validity of the use of logical propositions that ended up affirming any sort of positive position. Bhāvaviveka’s position would form the basic theme for Svātantrika 獨立論證派, a branch of Madhyamaka that developed in the eighth century. He criticized the theories of the Yogâcāras Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and Dignāga in the fifth chapter of his Madhyamaka-hṛdaya, also being critical of the theories of his contemporary, Dharmapāla. Although open debate between these two figures apparently did not occur, the controversy between their positions certainly did. In this argument, Bhāvaviveka championed the concept of śūnyatā, whereas Dharmapāla stood for the independent existence of external phenomena. (DDB)
15. 般若燈論: trans. Prabhākaramitra in 630–632; 15 fasc.; T 1566. A commentary on the verses of the Madhyamaka-kārikā 中論 that refutes the theories of earlier Buddhists and non-Buddhists. The logical method of argumentation he used in this work influenced succeeding generations of scholars, but was criticized by Candrakīrti. (DDB)
16. 有爲無爲 is found in T 1566 in a number of places, but 俗有眞空 is not.
17. 大乘掌珍論: trans. Xuanzang in 649; 2 fasc.; T 1578. A Madhyamaka work from the Svātantrika branch that deals with the meaning of the emptiness of dharmas. The debates between Madhyamaka and Yogâcāra that were in full swing when Xuanzang was at Nālanda focused on the teachings of Bhāvaviveka (representing Madhyamaka), on the one hand, and Sthiramati and Dharmapāla (representing Yogâcāra) on the other. The CWSL pays attention to these debates, supporting the Yogâcāra side. (DDB)
18. 護法: Dharmapāla was one of the ten great exponents of Yogâcāra in India, thought to have been born in the middle of the sixth century C.E. He wrote a commentary on Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikā, which was later translated into Chinese by Xuanzang. As a young man he studied and mastered the teachings of Buddhism, traveling extensively and becoming famous for his debates with non-Buddhists. Later he studied with Dignāga while staying at Nālanda temple. He taught Yogâcāra doctrine extensively and had many disciples. He is especially well known for his understanding that consciousness is always manifested in both its subjective and objective aspects, as distinguished from Sthiramati, who understood the bifurcation of consciousness into subject and object to be wholly imaginary. His interpretations regarding the nature of consciousness became predominant in the Faxiang stream of Xuanzang and Kuiji. (DDB)
19. 解深密經: Jie shenmi jing (Sūtra on Understanding Profound and Esoteric Doctrine). The most important scriptural source for the doctrines of the Yogâcāra school—the rest of its most foundational texts being treatises. It engages in in-depth discussions regarding the nature of the ālaya consciousness, the meaning of Consciousness-only, the three natures of knowing, the two kinds of meditation, the stages of the bodhisattva path, and the bodies of the Buddha. It is thought that the sūtra was put together around 300 C.E. a little after the time of Nāgârjuna, during the middle period of Mahāyāna sūtras. Chinese translations include complete versions by Bodhiruci (T 675; trans. in 514) and Xuanzang (T 676; trans. in 647), and partial versions by Guṇabhadra (T 678; trans. between 435 and 443) and Paramârtha (T 677; trans. in 557). There is no Sanskrit edition available, but there is a Tibetan translation, which was translated into English by John Powers as Wisdom of Buddha. There is an English translation from the Chinese by John Keenan (Scripture on the Explication of the Underlying Meaning), and a French translation by Lamotte, based on Xuanzang and the Tibetan versions. (DDB)
20. The Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra does not have this exact line, but makes a similar point in various places, such as T 676.16.688c23.
21. 辯中邊 論: 3 fasc.; T 1600. Xuanzang’s translation (in 661) of the Madhyântavibhāga-tīkā, which is more commonly known by the name applied to Paramârtha’s translation of the same text, the Zhongbian fenbie lun (T 1599). Probably the results of the combined efforts of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu. This is one of the fundamental texts of the Faxiang school. (DDB)
22. 佛地經論 (*Buddhabhūmisūtra-śāstra): by Bandhuprabha et al.; trans. Xuanzang in 650; 7 fasc.; T 1530. One of the most important works for the formulation of the matured form of Consciousness-only doctrine in East Asian Buddhism. It contains detailed explanations of Yogâcāra concepts such as the five capacities of beings, four forms of purified cognition, three natures, two hindrances, and so forth. The author explains the five kinds of dharma taught in the Buddhabhūmi in the form of combined commentaries on the same text. Since some of the passages reappear in the CWSL, some speculate that these parallel passages should be attributed to Dharmapāla (though neither this text nor the CWSL explicitly makes that attribution). A Tibetan translation of a commentary to the Buddhabhūmi also parallels passages in this text; Tibetans attribute that commentary to Śīlabhadra, the head of Nālanda while Xuanzang was there. Translated by John Keenan with the title The Interpretation of the Buddha Land. (DDB)
23. The actual line says: “After a thousand years, there will be two kinds of theories regarding emptiness”千載已後乃興空有二種異論。(T 1530.26.307a8–9).
24. 成唯識論 (*Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra): 10 fasc.; T 1585. Mainly a translation by Xuanzang of Dharmapāla’s commentary on the Thirty Verses on Consciousness-only 唯識三十頌, by Vasubandhu, but it also includes edited translations of other masters’ works on the same verses. It is the primary text of the Faxiang school. The aim of this work is to explain the entire received system of Yogâcāra in an organized fashion, and thus it is probably the most complete and balanced exposition of Yogâcāra in the entire Buddhist tradition. This is the only work by Xuanzang that is not a direct translation of a text but instead a selective, evaluative editorial, drawing on several (traditionally ten) distinct texts. Translated into English by Francis Cook for the Numata series in the volume entitled Three Texts on Consciousness Only with the title Demonstration of Consciousness Only. (DDB)
25. The full citation is: 我法非有空識非無。離有離無故契中道。 (T 1585.31.39b1–2).
26. 圓成實性: The “perfectly accomplished nature of reality” (Skt. pariniṣpanna-svabhāva) is understood to be the true essence of all things—“thusness”—all things as expressions of perfectly accomplished reality. It is the third of the three natures explained in Yogâcāra theory, the other two being existence based on attachment to imagination (false existence) and existence based on external causes (provisional existence). (DDB)
27. T 1585.31.46b17–18. Cf. Francis Cook, Demonstration of Consciousness Only, p. 285.
28. 化生 (Skt. upapāduka-yoni): “Miraculously transformed” refers to that which is born through spontaneous generation. In contrast to other types of birth, (i.e., from an egg, from a womb, from moisture), a species that is born suddenly without a specific origin and in which existence in full maturity is attained in an instant. This refers, for example, to the intermediate stage after death, where beings are reborn as spirits, gods, hell-beings, etc. (DDB)
29. The source text has 無違宗過, which we read as equivalent to the fallacy in Buddhist logic of contradicting one’s own tenets 自教相違過 (svaśāstra-viruddha).
30. 擇滅 (Skt. pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha): This is the annihilation of afflictions by the practice of analytical meditation, one of the two methods of cessation. (DDB)
31. The actual text says: 就世俗說有擇滅、出離涅槃寂靜微妙。如佛說有化生有情。說有無爲涅槃亦爾。許此有故無違宗過。但就眞性遮破擇滅。 (T 1578.30.274a22–24).
32. 圓測: Woncheuk (613–696), also known by the Chinese title of Ximing fashi 西明法師 after the name of the temple where he did his most important work. Originally from Korea, he lived at Ximing temple 西明寺 and studied at the beginning of the Tang dynasty with Xuanzang. Under Xuanzang’s influence, he specialized in the study of Consciousness-only (often differing with the viewpoints of Kuiji). He also studied and wrote commentaries on a broad spectrum of early Indian and Mahāyāna texts. He worked until his death in China, passing away in a monastery in Loyang. His best-known work was his commentary on the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra 解深密經疏, which has been studied seriously not only in East Asia, but in Tibet, where it was translated into the Tibetan language. (DDB)
33. The source text in the HBJ has 自, but we follow the source text of the *Karatala-ratna and use 白.
34. The actual text says: 「此非有言、唯遮有性。功能斯盡、無有勢力。更詮餘義、如世間說、非白絹言、不可卽執, 此言詮黑。」 (T 1578.30.270c11–13).
35. The full text reads: 「若就眞性、一切有爲都無所有。是立宗義、卽謗一切皆無所有。如是所立、墮邪見者。此中宗義、如前廣說、謂空無性。虛妄顯現門之差別、非一切種皆謗爲無。故汝不應作如是難。」 (T 1578.30.270c1–5)
36. 大乘廣百論釋論: trans. Xuanzang in 650; 10 fasc. Dharmapāla’s commentary on Āryadeva’s text (the Guangbai lun 廣百論), i.e., a Yogâcāra commentary on a Madhyamaka root text. Some passages from this text reappear in the CWSL. There is an English translation of the tenth chapter in Keenan, Dharmapāla’s Yogācāra Critique of Bhāvaviveka’s Mādhyamika Explanation of Emptiness. (DDB)
37. The actual text reads: 「又此空言、是遮非表、非唯空有、亦復空空。」 (T 1571.30.219b27–28)
38. 順憬: Also commonly listed as 順璟; best known for his work on post-Xuanzang Buddhist logic. Accounts vary as to whether or not he actually traveled to the Tang, but he was able to get hold of Xuanzang’s new Consciousness-only inference 眞唯識量 in the Silla, and based on this, established his own method of “indeterminacy of contradictory propositions” 決定相違不定量. During the 6–7th year of the reign of King Munmu 文武王 (666–667) he sent a copy of his proposal to the Tang via a tributary envoy. However, Xuanzang did not see it as he had already passed away a couple of years before. Nonetheless, it is said that Kuiji did have a look at it, and was greatly impressed. Some of his other writings also apparently made it to the Tang. (DDB)
39. 四句: The four logical possibilities (Skt. catuṣ-koṭi), the four terms of differentiation, e.g., of all propositions into A, not-A, both A and not-A, neither A nor not-A; or, empty, not empty, both empty and not empty, neither empty nor not empty (有, 無, 亦有亦無, 非有非無). For a modern study of catuṣkoṭi see D. S. Ruegg, “The Uses of the Four Positions of the Catuṣkoṭi and the Problem of the Description of Reality in Mahāyāna Buddhism.” (DDB)
40. 無著: Asaṅga (4th c.) A great early formulator of the Yogâcāra system who was a native of Puruṣapura in Gandhāra in northern India during the fourth century C.E., but lived mostly in Ayodhyā. Born the son of a Brahman and said to be the eldest brother of Vasubandhu, he was originally an Abhidharmist of the Mahīśāsaka school, but converted to Mahāyāna. The composition of several fundamental texts on Yogâcāra philosophy and practice, including the Mahāyānasaṃgraha-śāstra 攝大乘論 and Prakaranâryavāca-śāstra 顯揚聖教論 are attributed to him. (DDB)
41. 金剛般若波羅蜜經論: (Treatise on the Sūtra of Adamantine Transcendent Wisdom): Asaṅga’s commentary on the Bodhiruci translation of the Diamond Sūtra (T 236). There are two versions of this text, a Korean version and a Song-Yuan-Ming; they differ considerably in form and length, but are basically the same in terms of prose content. (DDB)
42. The source text reads: 「卽彼所有言說法身、出生如來福相。至得法身於彼、乃至說一四句偈、生福甚多。」 (T 1510.25.761b6–8).
43. 境行果: Object 境 refers to the objects of faith and understanding; practices 行 refers to the contemplative exercises 修行that arise from faith and understanding; realization 果 refers to that which is attained as a result of the practices. The objects include all dharmas of wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate quality, which one scrutinizes to determine whether they have an essence, are conditioned or unconditioned. Practice means to act upon the three kinds of wisdom of that which is heard, thought about, and cultivated. Realization based on contaminated 有漏practices results in the attainment of worldly effects; realization based on uncontaminated 無漏 practices results in the destruction of both hindrances 二障 and the attainment of great enlightenment. (DDB)
44. I.e., referring to the Prajñāpāramitā-upadeśa text just cited.
45. 三業 (Skt. trīni-karmāṇi): The three karmas, or three modes of activities of word, thought, and deed. (DDB)
46. Full title Cheng weishilun zhangzhong shuyao 成唯識論掌中樞要 (Essentials of the Discourse on the Theory of Consciousness-only in the Palm of Your Hand); by Kuiji; four fasc.; T 1831. One of the three major commentaries on the CWSL, along with the Cheng weishilun yanmilun yanmi 成唯識論演祕 and Cheng weishilun liaoyi deng 成唯識論了義燈. This text discussed points of contention within the CWSL, such as the theories of the five natures and three kinds of objects. The title is abbreviated as Shuyao 樞要. (DDB)
47. 四種涅槃: In the Faxiang school, nirvāṇa is distinguished into four types: (1) nirvāṇa of the originally pure self-nature, the original thusness of all existence: (2) thusness expressed in the extinction of the afflictive hindrances, called “nirvāṇa with remainder”; (3) “nirvāṇa without remainder,” wherein the afflictive hindrances in the mind are cut off, and the body in which the five skandhas was united is extinguished; and (4) “nirvāṇa with no abode,” wherein both the afflictive hindrances and the cognitive hindrances are eliminated through penetrating cognitiono of reality and saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are not distinguished. Not abiding in nirvāṇa nor disliking saṃsāra, one teaches sentient beings yet does not become attached to the world. (DDB)
48. The first of the four kinds of nirvāṇa mentioned above. Nirvāṇa as the fundamental purity of the mind, but not yet actualized.
49. The fourth of the four kinds of nirvāṇa introduced above.
50. 十地 (Skt. daśabhūmi): The ten bhūmis of bodhisattva practice in Mahāyāna Buddhism. They are the levels of practice that are only undertaken by bodhisattvas at an advanced stage of practice and that directly precede the attainment of final enlightenment. They come after the three worthy ranks 三賢 (which include thirty stages). In the Yogâcāra forty-one-stage path, these are the thirty-first through fortieth stages, and in the fifty-two-stage path found in the Flower Ornament Sūtra and other Tathāgatagarbha sutras, the forty-first through the fiftieth stages (Yogâcāra does not include the ten stages of faith at the beginning as do the Tathāgatagarbha texts). Each of the stages is associated with the subjugation or elimination of a certain type of obstruction to enlightenment. There minor variations in the content of the ten, depending on the text. (DDB)
51. The source of this discussion in the Shuyao is at T 1831.43. 613a14–17: 唯識性者自性淸淨涅槃。滿淸淨者、有餘無餘二種涅槃、要果圓時方證得故。分淸淨者、卽無住處涅槃、許十地位已證得故。涅槃雖四體總眞如。
52. The content of the three names of essence 體三名 and the three names of meaning 義三名 is explained in detail in the Yinming ru zhengli lun shu 因明入正理論疏 at T 1840.44.98b3–11.
53. This can be rendered schematically as follows:
54. This is the Yuqie shidi lun shi 瑜伽師地論釋, which says at 五識地等。理實亦攝有義。如來有爲功德、有餘依攝。無爲功德、無餘依攝。 (T 1580.30.887c29–888a2).
55. 佛臨涅槃記法住經 Fo linniepan ji fazhu jing: , trans. Xuanzang in 652; 1 fasc.; T 390. (DDB)
56. 四智 (Skt. catvāri-jñāni): In Yogâcāra, the four kinds of pure cognition realized at the full enlightenment of the Buddha, first introduced in Asaṅga’s Mahāyānasaṃgraha. These are (1) “mirror cognition” (Skt. ādarśa-jñāna) 大圓鏡智, the purified form of the eighth, ālayavijñāna; (2) “cognition of equality in nature” 平等性智 (Skt. samatā-jñāna), the purified form of the seventh, manas; (3) “wondrous observing cognition” 妙觀察智 (Skt. pratyavekṣa-jñāna), the purified form of the sixth, mano-vijñāna; and (4) “cognition unrestricted in its activity” 成所作智 (Skt. kṛtya-anusthāna-jñāna), the purified form of the five sense consciousnesses. (DDB)
57. The Shuyao says: 菩提卽是四智品法、二智在因得、謂妙觀、平等、二智果中得。總而言者、菩提因已得。 (T 1831.43.613a28–b1).
58. Cf. Shuyao: 今論所言唯識性者、此是菩提事唯識性。又卽眞如、顯是菩提所證體性、而意取彼能證菩提。 (T 1831.43.613b8–11).
59. 因位 (Skt. hetv-avasthā): Also written 因地. The period of practice before enlightenment, esp., the stages of a bodhisattva’s practice before the attainment of Buddhahood. (DDB)
60. 轉依 (Skt. āśraya-parāvṛtti): The “transformation of the basis” is the conversion of our distorted modes of cognition into accurately reflecting modes. See the discussion of the four kinds of [purified] cognition 四智 in the note above. In the ninth fascicle of the CWSL, “turning” is said to have a dual significance: (1) 轉捨, turning away; i.e., getting rid of; and (2) 轉得, turning toward; i.e., acquiring. (DDB)
61. The actual text reads: 成立唯識意、爲有情證得如斯二轉依果。 (T 1585.31.51a8–9).
62. Here this is the Cheng weishilun shuji: 於所歸敬合有七釋。三如樞要、今以理准四義不同。一者唯敬法而非人[...]二者但敬人而非法[...]三者雙敬法之與人[...] 四者歸敬佛法僧寶。 (T 1830.43.232c7–233a9).
63. The original text says: 「 復次若欲造論、當先歸禮二所敬師、方可造論。恭敬法故、先應歸禮論本大師、恭敬義故、復應歸禮開闡義師。」 (T 1579.30.658a9–11).
64. The seven motivations given for the composition of the root text of the CWSL are: (1) reverencing only nirvāṇa 唯敬涅槃, (2) reverencing only bodhi 唯敬菩提, (3) reverencing both bodhi and nirvāṇa 雙敬菩提涅槃, (4) reverencing the dharma and not the person 敬法非人, (5) reverencing the person and not the dharma 敬人非法, (6) revering both person and dharma 雙敬人法, (7) revering buddha, dharma, and saṃgha 敬佛法僧.
65. I.e., a master of the Buddhist canon.
66. Kuiji has a similar discussion the: Shuyao: 以唯識性第七轉聲中說所於聲也、非所依聲、以第七聲通根境故。此爲能差別、滿分淨者爲所差別。第四轉中說、以一切所敬皆以第四所爲聲說。若唯識性亦所敬者、應第四攝。然依蘇漫多聲說、卽是八轉也。 (T 1831.43.613b27–c3)
67. 遍計所執性 (Skt. parikalpita-svabhāva): The nature of existence dependent upon arbitrary conceptualization—the way the discriminating mind of regular people functions to continually label, classify, and schematize everything based on linguistic constructions. What results is a constructed world that is starkly removed from reality. As one of the three modes of cognition 三性, it is the mode engaged in by unenlightened people, and can be correlated to what is characterized in other Buddhist systems as delusion, or ignorance. (DDB)
68. 依他起性 (Skt. paratantra-svabhāva): The nature of existence as arising in dependence on other things, which is one of the three modes of perceiving existence taught in the Yogâcāra school. This is a more accurate way of understanding the world than that of pervasive discrimination 遍計所執, recognizing that phenomena lack any independent existence. (DDB)
69. In the CWSL, see T 1585.31.48a28–b3: 謂唯識性略有二種、一者虛妄, 謂遍計所執、二者眞實、謂圓成實性。爲簡虛妄說實性言。復有二性、一者世俗、謂依他起、二者勝義、謂圓成實。爲簡世俗故說實性。 In the Shuyao, see T 1831.43.614a6–11: 唯識性言、旣境第七、略有二解。一依三性、二依二諦。依三性者、唯識第九云、謂唯識性略有二種、一虛妄, 謂計所執、二眞實、謂圓成實性。復有二種、一世俗、謂依他起、二勝義、謂圓成實。故知三性竝名唯識性。
70. 攝大乘論釋: She dashenglun shi (Skt. *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha-bhāṣya). This name is attached to two commentaries on Asaṅga’s Mahāyāna-saṃgraha—the one by his brother Vasubandhu and the other by Asvabhāva; trans. into Chinese by Paramârtha and Xuanzang. Following the text to which it is a commentary, this work gives extensive treatment to all of the major Yogâcāra theories regarding conscious construction, including the ālayavijñāna, affliction, seeds, perfuming, etc. The text cited here is that by Asvabhāva as translated by Xuanzang (T 1598), also known as the Wuxingshe lun 無性攝論. (DDB)
71. T 1598.380a27. This section of the Hakgi is a distillation of a longer argument in the Shuyao (T 1831.43.614c19 ff.).
72. 安慧: Sthiramati was an Indian master of the Yogâcāra school (7th c. C.E.). Mainly because of the characterization of him in the CWSL, he is considered in East Asia to be one of the ten great masters of the Yogâcāra school. He is known for refuting the theories of Saṃghabhadra through his treatises on the Abhidharmakośa and on Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikā. In addition to his mention in the CWSL, discoveries of Sanskrit texts by later scholars have separately confirmed his role as an important Yogâcāra master, showing that his interpretations of key Yogâcāra theories of consciousness differed sharply from those of such thinkers as Dharmapāla. For instance, Sthiramati understood the bifurcation of consciousness into subject and object to be wholly imaginary, while Dharmapāla understood that consciousness is always manifested in both its subjective and objective aspects. He also established the theory of the “self-witnessing aspect” 自證分 of consciousness. (DDB)
73. See T 1580.30.883a20–22: 說此論。所爲云何。謂有二緣故說此論。一爲如來無上法教久住世故。二爲平等利益安樂諸有情故。
74. 世親: Along with his half-brother Asaṅga, Vasubandhu is considered to be one of the main formulators of the Indian Yogâcāra school, and indeed one of the most influential figures in the entire history of Buddhism. Born in Puruṣapura of Gandhāra, in the fifth century (Takakusu suggests 420–500; Peri puts his death not later than 350), he was at first an Abhidharmist, writing the massive Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya 倶舍論, which is only one of his thirty-six works. He later converted to Mahāyāna and composed many other voluminous treatises. (DDB)
75. 難陀: Nanda was a Yogâcāra master who lived in the sixth century C.E. in northern India, thus a contemporary of Sthiramati. He is considered to be one of the “ten masters” of the school of Yogâcāra. He developed the theory of “newly perfumed seeds” and is remembered as the proponent of the bipartite theory of consciousness, which admitted a noetic and noematic component (見 and 相), but not the reflexive consciousness 自證 added in Dignāga’s tripartite theory nor the additional awareness of reflexive consciousness 證自證 propounded in the fourfold scheme of the Dharmapāla school, which became normative in East Asia thanks to the influence of Xuanzang. He is said to have written a commentary on the Yogâcārabhūmi-śāstra, but it is not extant. His exact dates of birth and death are uncertain. (DDB)
76. 火辨: Described by Kuiji as one of the ten masters of the Indian Yogâcāra school, a contemporary and colleague of Vasubandhu. (DDB)
77. 二障: The afflictive hindrances (kleśâvaraṇa 煩惱障) and the cognitive hindrances (jñeyâvaraṇa). Xuanzang rendered cognitive hindrances as 所知障, with the earlier rendering (in both Yogâcāra and Tathāgatagarbha works) usually being 智障. These two categories can be seen as a distinctly Buddhist way of articulating what Buddhism takes to be the basic problem of the human condition: (1) that we suffer from a wide range of emotive imbalances, such as anger, jealousy, pride, lust, dishonesty, and so forth, because (2) we live in a state of continuous misapprehension of reality, reifying and attaching to conceptual constructs that indicate our own existence as an autonomous “self,” along with the assumed intrinsic, “as-is” reality of the objects that surround us. In Yogâcāra, the term “afflictive hindrances” refers primarily to the mental factors 心所 that are of unwholesome 不善 quality, which bring suffering and anxiety to sentient beings. Included here are the factors enumerated in such categories as the six fundamental afflictions 六煩惱 and twenty secondary afflictions 隨煩惱, along with their derivatives. In the most standard Yogâcāra definition (as one will find in such texts as the Yogâcārabhūmi-śāstra, CWSL, etc.), the afflictive hindrances are said to have their origin in the attachment to a view of self (我執 ātma-grāha). They are said to operate within the first seven “forthcoming consciousnesses” 轉識 and can be eliminated by the gradual practices of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. The cognitive hindrances are derived from the fundamental error of understanding dharmas (“phenomena”) to exist intrinsically (法執; dharma-graha). The eminent Silla scholar Wonhyo (617–686) wrote a detailed treatise on the topic, entitled Ijang ui (二障義; System of the Two Hindrances), for which a translation by A. Charles Muller is forthcoming from the University of Hawai`i Press in a volume entitled Wonhyo’s Philosophy of Mind. (DDB)
78. For an explanation of the eight consciousnesses, see the DDB at http://buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?51.xml+id('b516b-8b58'). For a detailed essay on the development of the eighth consciousness (ālayavijñāna) see http://buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?96.xml+id('b963f-8cf4–8036–8b58').
79. Following the note in the HBJ, the doubled character 爲爲 here is taken as an error.
80. The Yogâcāra understanding of the function of consciousness in the continual re-creation of the mind-stream that is taken as subject is generally distinguished into three phases. Mental factors, such as malevolent afflictions (but it can be any kind of mental event) are produced from metaphorical seeds (bījas) that constitute the store consciousness. Their production takes the form of manifest activity 現行 (samudācāra), and manifest activity in turn creates habit energies (vāsanā) 習氣 that “perfume” (impregnate) the store consciousness, creating new seeds. For a lucid explanation of this process, see Shun’ei Tagawa, Living Yogācāra: An Introduction to Consciousness-only, chap. 3 and 4.
81. 九品: This is a reference to the 九品惑—“nine kinds of affliction”—which is a categorization of the removable afflictions of desire 貪, anger 瞋, pride 慢, and ignorance 無明 into coarse and subtle according to nine levels. These in turn are divided among nine regions 九地 in the three realms 三界to make a total of eighty-one types. See Wonhyo’s discussion of the release from the nine categories of bondage in his Ijang ui at HBJ 1.807c21 ff. (DDB)
82. This is a summary of the three objections on this point raised in the Shuyao at T 1831.43.616b15–26. The full text reads: 是凡夫位伏斷修行、斷重障下。是聖人眞斷得、眞斷得中分見修別。修中由我法執等有三難生。一難、安惠論師煩惱障中有非執者、二乘斷修惑九品、斷前八品猶未斷我見、云何已斷餘障。明知餘障不從我執等生。二難、安惠論師除第七識說有二取,皆是所執、證二空位、若由執滅障隨斷者、一切皆執、五地云何方除害伴。應輕執隨生我執四地斷故。三、若一切障皆從執生、何故六七地等所斷之障、不名害伴、名羸劣等。皆是執起故。答、有三解。一云此依究竟盡處爲論、不說中間。二云但言障由執生執斷障滅、不言末障滅皆隨本執斷、二乘九品其義可知。三、雖有漏心、皆有法執、菩薩執生有三時斷、未執隨本、第六識執有三位斷。
83. This passage refers to the three kinds of elimination of attachment in connection with the sixth consciousness. It is based on the passage in the Shuyao at T 1831.43.616b22–c4. 答有三解、一、云此依究竟盡處爲論、不說中間。二、云但言障由執生、執斷障滅、不言末障滅皆隨本執斷、二乘九品其義可知。三雖有漏心皆有法執、菩薩執生有三時斷、未執隨本。第六識執有三位斷、一倶時、二鄰近引生、三勢力疎遠。倶起者四地執倶斷、鄰近引生者名害伴、疎遠勢生者名羸劣等、故障與執斷有前後。
84. This is also a reference to a passage in the Shuyao in which three transformations 三轉依 are identified: 「因位有三轉依、謂心道麤重。二空是心、法性心故。正解是道、斷二重障、名麤重轉。」 (T 1843.43.616a10–12).
85. 有學: Practitioners who are still actively pursuing applied practices (Skt. śaikṣa)—who are still learning and progressing in the Buddhist path, who are not yet perfected, who are in the first three stages of training and have not yet attained the fourth stage, that of those beyond the need of further teaching or study 無學; the stage of arhat. Those still in training have eradicated distorted views 見倒 (dṛṣṭi-viparyāsa) but have not gotten rid of subtle cognitive errors 心顚倒 (citta-viparyāsa). (DDB)
86. This exact line does not appear in the Saṃdhinirmocana, but similar themes can be found at T 676.16.695b1–8 and T 676.16.696b9–10.
87. 菩薩瓔珞本業經: Pusa yingluo benye jing; 2 fasc.; T 1485. Modern scholarship considers this text to have been written in China during the fifth or sixth century C.E. In common with the Flower Ornament Sūtra 華嚴經, Sūtra for Humane Kings 仁王經, Sūtra of Brahma’s Net 梵網經, and the like, it discusses the course of the bodhisattva’s practice through the fifty-two stages, the pure precepts, the ten pāramitās, etc. The only commentary that dealt with this treatise exclusively was that done by Wonhyo, of which only the second fascicle remains. Commonly referred to by the short titles of 本業經 and 瓔珞經, but the latter abbreviation also refers to another scripture of similar name. (DDB)
88. 等覺: As the second to the last stage of the Mahāyāna path scheme, “virtual enlightenment” (in Yogâcāra, the 41st stage; in Huayan, the 51st stage) is the stage of the most advanced bodhisattvas who are ready to attain perfect enlightenment. In this case 等 means “equal,” implying that the bodhisattva’s level of awakening at this stage is essentially the same as that of a buddha. It is the state that precedes marvelous enlightenment 妙覺. (DDB)
89. T 1634 does not seem to have a line that comes close to this in form or meaning.
90. 無間道: One of the four paths 四道 taught in the Abhidharma texts (the four are the path of applied practice 加行道, the instantaneous path 無間道, the path of liberation 解脫道, and the path of superb advancement 勝進道). Also called the “unobstructed path” 無礙道 (Skt. ānantarya-mārga). The stage after the path of initiation of practices, wherein one eliminates the power of the afflictions to attach themselves to one’s person. In Yogâcāra, the stage at which one gains the determination to destroy affliction. (DDB)
91. 解脫道 (Skt. vimokṣa-mārga): One of the graduated paths of practices that appear in various Yogâcāra and Abhidharma texts. Following upon the instantaneous path 無間道, one is instantly liberated from the afflictions that one has been counteracting. (DDB)
92. In Huizhao’s 慧昭 Chengweishilun liaoyi deng 成唯識論了義燈 we read: 西明云、三藏解、等覺者、無間解脫同斷一障、故言等覺、非謂解齊、名之爲等、今又助解。 (T 1832.43.673b5–7).
93. The original citation in full, with context, reads: 諸佛世尊斷因果故見則了了、一切覺者名爲佛性、十住菩薩不得名爲一切覺故、是故雖見而不明了。善男子、見有二種、一者眼見、二者聞見。諸佛世尊眼見佛性、如於掌中觀阿摩勒、十住菩薩聞見佛性故不了了、十住菩薩唯能自知定得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提、而不能知一切衆生悉有佛性。 (T 374.12.527b20–b27).
94. 妙覺: Marvelous enlightenment is the incomprehensibly subtle level of enlightenment attained by the Buddha, through which he enlightens others. In Mahāyāna descriptions of a graded path, this is the final stage (Skt. buddhâgrya). (DDB)
95. Citation not found.
96. 彼分涅槃: Pibun yeolban, as distinguished from true nirvāṇa (called “this-part nirvāṇa” 此分涅槃). That-part nirvāṇa is a provisional nirvāṇa wherein, while the afflictions have been partially removed, their seeds cannot yet be eliminated. The Yogâcārabhūmi-śāstra says: “Therefore it is explained that one should enter that concentration and not linger in bliss. Since the afflictions are only partially removed, the condition is still indecisive, and thus it is called that-part nirvāṇa. Since it is not final nirvāṇa, it is called nirvāṇa with distinctions.” 是故爲說應入彼定非爲樂住、或復名爲彼分涅槃、亦得說名差別涅槃。由諸煩惱一分斷故、非決定故、名彼分涅槃。非究竟涅槃故、名差別涅槃。 (T 1579.331a16–19). In his commentary on this passage, Kuiji further clarifies that the portion of the afflictions that is removed is their active aspect, and that the part that remains, not eliminated, is the latent (seed) aspect. 眞涅槃名此分涅槃、假涅槃名彼分。 (T 1829.43.69b11–12); 現行煩惱一分斷故、種子未斷、後還退生、非決定故、名彼分涅槃。69b4–6; 又一分斷故、淨定及一分無漏、折伏煩惱、名彼分涅槃。(69b8–9) (DDB)
97. 二空眞如: This refers to the experience of thusness attained upon the eradication of the two delusory views of attachment to self and attachment to phenomena: the thusness of the emptiness of self 人空眞如 and the thusness of the emptiness of phenomena 法空眞如. (DDB)
98. General and specific can be understood as referring to the broader and narrower interpretations of the two hindrances. In their narrower interpretation, they have distinct causes, objects of obstruction, and remedies. Interpreted broadly, their functions greatly overlap. Broadly speaking, both hindrances obstruct both accurate cognition and the elimination of afflictions. Narrowly speaking, the cognitive hindrances obstruct cognition, and the afflictive hindrances obstruct the removal of afflictions. See, for example, T 2772.85.405a13–16: 問, 所知障亦障涅槃、云何但說障菩提也。答、依唯識論、理實二障通障、卽就勝而言、煩惱障涅槃 所知障菩提也。
99. Correcting 知 in the HBJ to 如 as found in the CWSL.
100. 數論: Sāṃkhya was an Indian brahmanistic philosophical sect. Often mentioned in Buddhist treatises as one of the six non-Buddhist schools 六外道 and proponents of the four non-Buddhist views of causation 外道四執. Kapila 數論師, the founder of the Sāṃkhya philosophy, “enumerated” 數all concepts in twenty-five categories (tattvas, or “true principles”) 二十五諦, with puruṣa 神我 and prakṛti 冥性 at the head and the others in ordered progress. The object of this paradigm was to effect the final liberation of the twenty-fifth tattva (puruṣa, “soul”) from the fetters of the phenomenal creation by conveying the correct knowledge of the twenty-four other tattvas and rightly discriminating the puruṣa from them. For details, see the DDB. (DDB)
101. 勝論宗: Vaiśeṣika is a school of Indian philosophy, the foundation of which is ascribed to Kaṇāda 迦那陀. The school, when combined with the Nyāya, is also known as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. It is the oldest of the so-called “six non-Buddhist schools” of Indian philosophy 六外道. The Sanskrit vaiśeṣika literally means “referring to the distinctions” (viśeṣa). The Vaiśeṣikas chiefly occupied themselves, as did orthodox Nyāya philosophy, with theories of knowledge, but the school differed by distinguishing only six categories of cognition 六句義 (padârthas), viz. substance, quality, activity, species, distinction, and correlation. For details, see the DDB. (DDB)
102. Although the doctrine of no-self is assumed to be a cornerstone of Buddhist doctrine, in an effort to explain the phenomenon of individuated causation through multiple lifetimes, there were various Indian schools—ostensibly Buddhist—that supported the notion of an enduring soul. The existence and content of these schools in outlined in the text described in the next note.
103. 異部宗輪論: The Yibuzong lun lun (Skt. Samaya-bhedoparacana cakra); 1 fasc.; T 2031. An essay written by the Sarvâstivāda scholar-monk Vasumitra concerning the unorthodox and schismatic doctrines within the Buddhist saṃgha that began to arise soon after the parinirvāṇa of the Buddha and that led to the proliferation of schools and the differing points of doctrines that separated them. It is both a history of early Buddhism and a lament for the fragmentation of the Buddha’s teaching. Translated in the BDK series by Tsukamoto Keishō and Charles Willemen as The Treatise on the Elucidation of the Knowable. (DDB)
104. 犢子部: One of the twenty early Indian schools, derived from the Sarvâstivāda about three hundred years after the death of the Buddha. (DDB)
105. 經量部: One of the twenty early Indian schools, of which there was an original group and a derivative group, both of which posited a basic seed-consciousness theory. The original group developed the idea of the continuation of saṃsāra by mutual perfuming of consciousness and materiality; the branch group established the theory of a subtle and uninterrupted base consciousness, which became a precursor for the Yogâcāra notion of ālayavijñāna. This school was known for its strict reliance on the sūtras, rather than on śāstras and Abhidharma. (DDB)
106. 正量部: The “school of correct logic” One of the twenty early Indian schools. Approximately three hundred years after the Buddha’s nirvāṇa, four divisions were formed from the Vātsīputrīya school, of which this was the third. It was an influential school whose adherents were active in the early centuries C.E. Its positions are set forth in the Sanmidi bu lun 三彌底部論, where the existence of the pudgala (soul) is taught. It is also taught that an arhat can fall from arhatship, that a god can enter the Buddhist path, and that even non-Buddhists extirpate afflictions. (DDB)
107. See T 2031.49.15b12 ff.
108. 說一切有部: Sarvâstivāda was one of the major branches of Indian Abhidharma Buddhism, developed some two hundred years after Śākyamuni’s death, and one of the twenty schools during the Nikāya period of Indian Buddhism; understood to be derived from the Sthavira school. The founder is listed variously as Rāhula and as Kātyāyanīputra. Although they denied the existence of a unitary self, the adherents of this school were known for their belief in the inherent existence of dharmas (phenomena). They analyzed these into five groups, including seventy-five distinct dharmas. Most of its doctrines are defined in the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya, and many of them would also be included, in modified form, in the doctrine of Yogâcāra. (DDB)
109. 化地部: An early Indian school that branched off from Sarvâstivāda about three hundred years after Śākyamuni’s death. Their beliefs were close to those of the Mahāsāṃghikas, especially regarding the point that past and future do not have true existence, that only the present truly exists. This school is especially known in later Buddhist history for its influential Five-Part Vinaya 五分律, translated by Buddhajīva C.E. 423–424. (DDB)
110. 後得智 (Skt. pṛṣṭha-labdha-jñāna): As contrasted with innate cognition 根本智, subsequently-attained cognition is the knowledge attained as a result of enlightenment that the bodhisattvas use for the task of liberating other sentient beings. Buddhas and bodhisattvas are able to utilize their discriminating capacities after attaining enlightenment, but without reifying and appropriating notions regarding their own selfhood or the intrinsic reality of objects. The existence of this clear function means that they understand and take advantage of conventional “realities” and are thus not disconnected from the world; also rendered as 分別智. (DDB)
111. More often found in the variant form of 卻談.
112. For a more detailed discussion of the Vātsīputrīyas view on self vis-à-vis the realization of the arhat, see Dainichi kyōsho shishin shō 大日經疏指心鈔, at T 2217.59.658b11 ff.
113. 阿毘達磨倶舍論: By Vasubandhu, trans. between 563 and 567 by Paramârtha (22 fasc.; T 1559) and between 651 and 654 by Xuanzang (30 fasc.; T 1558). This is Vasubandhu’s most important pre-Yogâcāra work. Consisting of verses with exposition, the Kośa organizes and condenses primarily Sarvâstivāda Abhidharma teachings, but not without being critical, and hence adopting positions associated with other Buddhist schools, such as the Sautrāntikas. This text includes detailed analysis of the action of human consciousness in its relationship to the environment, as well as the transformations that occur in the process of meditation practice; it contains treatment of most of the philosophical topics contained in the Abhidharma treatises as well as a refutation of the theories of the Vaibhāṣikas. (DDB)
114. See T 1558.29.154c9 ff.
115. The source text in the HBJ gives 異竟無 with a note indicating the possibility of 境 instead of 竟. The source text in Taishō gives 許除畢竟無. If we use 境 as in the HBJ version, then we have “separate objects do not exist.” If we use the Taishō version, we have “ultimately non-existent.”
116. 心心所: The mind itself along with its various detailed functions; mind and the factors of sentient existence that are directly associated with the mind. The mind as basis in this sense is sometimes referred to in East Asian Yogâcāra works as “mind-king” 心王 (Skt. citta-caitta). This is derived from Kuiji’s Cheng weishilun shuji 成唯識論述記: 述曰、自下別敍邪執有二、初別敍四計、後例破餘。此第一計。薩婆多等、依說十二處密意言教、諸部同執離心之境如識非無。彼立量云、其我所說離心之境、決定實有。許除畢竟無、心境二法隨一攝故、如心心所。此皆依經說有色等、不能繁引。 (T 1830.43.236b25–c2) (DDB)
117. 不定過 (Skt. anaikāntika doṣa): In Buddhist logic, “inconclusive[ness]” is a technical term for the case where there is a fault in either the second or third among the three properties of the reason 因三相—i.e., either in the reason definitely having the same qualities as the proposition (in the case of a positive example) 同品定有性 or the reason being totally devoid of the same qualities of the proposition (in the case of a negative example), and thus the proposition cannot be validated. There are six kinds of fallacies of inconclusiveness. (DDB)
118. This passage in Zenju has 非無 after 內識. T 2261.65.376a18.
119. 此 is corrected to 比.
120. Zenju’s treatment of this text helpfully adds the Hetuvidyā argument markers: 量云。外境非無 [宗]能所取中隨一攝故 [因]如論主內識非無 [喩] . (T 2261.65.376a19–20).
121. 三比量: There are three kinds of reasoning, or inference, in Buddhist logic: (1) offering one’s own inference 自比量, (2) inviting the opponent by using his line of reasoning 他比量, and (3) approaching with a line of reasoning that is accepted by both parties 共比量. (DDB)
122. And perhaps more specifically a reference to the Sautrāntikas, based on the following passage from the Jushelun songshu chao: 倶舍論頌疏抄: 有別體性文惠云。有別體性者。此破經部許緣無境生心。如緣過未世･及三無爲･空花･第十三處等生意識。有部卽不許緣無生心。 緣過未等。卽是緣過未名等生心。 (T 2254.64.542a9–12)
123. 分別相似過類: Or “fallacy of a difference in a positive example”; having a distinction in a positive example; the third of the fourteen possible fallacies in the Old Logic 十四過類. For example, a Vaiśeṣika says: “[thesis:] Language is impermanent; [Reason:] because it is something that occurs after making some kind of effort; [Example:] for example, like an earthenware pot.” In this case, the earthenware pot is something that can be scorched and is visible, and since words do not have these qualities, there is a difference. So even though an earthenware pot is impermanent, it might be stated that language is not. (DDB)
124. Again assuming 此 to be mistakenly used for 比.
125. 法差別相違因: Also called a contradicting implied-predicate (Skt. dharma-viśeṣa-viruddha-hetu). A Sāṃkhya against a Buddhist: “[Thesis:] The eyes are serviceable to another one’s needs, [Reason:] because they are composite substances, [Example:] like a bed.” Among the thirty-three fallacies 三十三過 this is one of the fourteen fallacies in the category of the reason 因十四過, and within this group, the second of the four fallacies of contradiction in the reason 四相違. A reason set forth, the implications of which are contradictory to what is to be proved. The Nyāyapraveśa says: 如說眼等必為他用。積聚性故。如臥具等。此因如能成立眼等必為他用。如是亦能成立所立法差別相違積聚他用。諸臥具等為積聚他所受用故。 (T 1630.32.12a15). In Buddhist logic, this is one of the four errors of contradictory reasons 四相違過. (DDB)
126. 有法自相相違因 (Skt. dharmi-svarūpa-viparīta-sādhana): Kaṇāda says to Pañcaśikha: “[Thesis:] Being is neither substance, nor quality nor action; [Reason:] because it possesses substance, quality, and action, [Example:] like particularity.” One of the four kinds of fallacy of contradiction in the reason 四相違過. (DDB)
127. See Shuji T 1830.43.236c3–9: 述曰、此第二計。卽學中百淸辨等師、依密意教說諸法空、便亦撥心體非實有。彼立量云、汝之內識、如境非有、許所知故。如汝心外境、淸辨俗諦外境許有、今就中道無自違失。又掌珍中依勝義諦、說有爲無爲竝是空等、皆如彼說。
128. 有法: In Buddhist logic, the dharmin, the factual base, is the substrate or locus in which the property (dharma) identified in the sādhya (the property-to-be-proven) resides. Wayman, in A Millennium of Logic, translates as “factual base” and “feature base.” (DDB)
129. HBJ offers 關 as an alternative for 開.
130. Following the note in HBJ, using前 instead of 傳.
131. 相分: One of the four aspects of cognition in Yogâcāra theory as finalized by Dharmapāla. It generally means object of perception, but more specifically, that image of the outside world that is kept within the mind. In this case, the character 相 means image or reflection. Since this aspect means object(s) of perception, it does not yet have an active conceptual function. (DDB)
132. 見分: The second of the four components of cognition in Yogâcāra theory. The function of seeing the form of an object. In this case, the ideograph 見 means “to shed light on” or “illuminate.” When the substance of the mind and mental functions is produced from the ālayavijñāna, simultaneously with the manifestation of the object, the illuminating function of the subject arises. (DDB)
133. Zenju’s rendering of this passage is slightly more complete, and thus adds clarity: 然清辨計○有何心也 云云 貶量云。且如眼識縁青等時。心即是青。離青等外無別能縁。乃至眞智證理時。唯是眞空。空外無別能證眞智。雖據世俗心境倶有。境實心虚。虚者從實名爲唯境。 (T 2262.65.439c11–15).
134. This is a reference to a theory of the constitution of the eight consciousnesses put forth by one group of masters. The Shuji says: 述曰、此第三計。卽大乘中一類菩薩、依相似教說識體一。攝論第四說一意識菩薩計。一、依遠行、及獨行教。遊歷諸境故說遠行、復言獨行無第二故。二、依五根所行境界、意各能受教。三、依六識身皆名意處教。四、又解深密瑜伽等、說如依一鏡上有多影像教。五、如依一水中有多波喩教。此恐違至教故說有一識。有云 一意識、但說前六識爲一意識、理必不然。此說八識體是一故。 (T 1830.43 .236c10–19).
135. From the She dashenglun ben: 又於此中有一類師說一意識。彼彼依轉得彼彼名、如意思業名身語業。 (T 1594.31.138c24–25).
136. 法足經: The Fazu jing. Cited in several Yogâcāra commentarial works as advocating the position that the mind functions independently of objects. Listed in some catalogs, but nothing is found in any reference work. (DDB)
137. The She dasheng lun shilun 攝大乘論釋論 says: 論曰、此中有偈、遠去及獨行、無身住空窟、能伏難伏心、我說爲梵行。釋曰、彼諸菩薩成就所說、故引諸阿含偈、言遠去者攀緣一切境界故、獨行者更無第二故。 (T 1596.31.286c19–24).
138. The She dasheng lun shilun says: 論曰、又如經說十二入中、說六識身爲意入。釋曰、復有阿含說六識身說名爲意、無別餘識名故。佛說六識身名爲意入、是故得知唯獨有意。 (T 1596.31.287a5–8).
139. 攝大乘論釋, T 1597.31.339c28–29. 非離意識別有餘識、唯除別有阿賴耶識。
140. 阿陀那識: ādāna-vijñāna, meaning “appropriating consciousness” or “clinging consciousness.” In Yogâcāra, basically synonymous with ālaya-vijñāna (store consciousness), but expressing the special connotation of “that which holds the body and the sense organs together.” It is also understood to be the consciousness that contains all seeds and that is responsible for the linking of rebirths. (DDB)
141. 末那識: The manas, meaning “mentation,” is the seventh of the eight consciousnesses taught in Yogâcāra. As the consciousness that localizes experience through thinking, its primary function is to perceive the subjective position of the eighth consciousness and construe it as one’s own self, thereby creating self-attachment. It also has the function of “continually examining and assessing” 恆審思量 things to determine their benefit or harm to the subject (T 1585.31.7b28). It shares some mental factors with the sixth consciousness (mano-vijñāna), but whereas the latter has interruptions, the manas functions 24/7 without lapse. The ālayavijñāna, on the other hand, while functioning continuously like the manas, has no discriminating functions. Not consciously controllable, the manas is said to give rise to conscious decisions in regard to individual survival, and to incessant self-infatuation. (DDB)
142. 成實論: Chengshi lun; also called the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra; attrib. Harivarman (c. 250–350), trans. into Chinese by Kumārajīva; 16 fasc. T 1646;. A scholastic text that analyzes all factors of cognitive experience into eighty-four types while giving extensive treatment to the concept of emptiness, asserting that all existence is nominal in a way that draws close to Mahāyāna. The doctrine of this work is to be regarded as the pinnacle of philosophical development attained by the Hīnayāna schools, and thus constitutes a transitional stage between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. It teaches the attainment of nirvāṇa through the destruction of attachment to names, elements, and emptiness, yet its understanding of emptiness is still analytical emptiness, rather than the “essential emptiness” of the later Mahāyāna schools. The Sanskrit source text is not extant. (DDB)
143. Although the text locates this passage in the eighth fascicle, it is in the fifth fascicle of the version of the text presently available.
144. 覺天: Buddhadeva was a Sarvâstivāda scholar who was known as one of the “four masters” of the Mahāvibhāṣā, each of whom interpreted differently the cardinal doctrine of Kaśmīra Sarvâstivāda, that dharmas exist in the three time periods. Buddhadeva explained the difference among past, present, and future factors as a difference in relativity (apekṣā): a certain factor can be called past or future just as the same woman can be called a mother or a daughter. On the other hand, Buddhadeva often holds views that are usually associated with the Dārṣṭāntikas—the philosophical opponents of Sarvâstivāda in the Mahāvibhāṣā, for example, the view that all mental factors are nothing else than a particular form of mind itself. (DDB)
145. 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (Skt. Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra; Treatise of the Great Commentary on the Abhidharma): by Kātyāyanīputra; 200 fasc.; T 1545. Traditionally held to have been composed in Kashmir around the second century C.E., but the actual date is uncertain. A key philosophical treatise of the Kaśmīra Sarvâstivāda school; it presents and argues against the theories of various other schools—though it is not held to be the earliest extant text of that school. (DDB)
146. 大種 (Skt. mahā-bhūta): The four great elements, which enter into all things, i.e., earth, water, fire, and wind, from which, as from seeds, all things spring. (DDB)
147. The source text reads: 尊者覺天作如是說、名二十二、實體唯一、所謂意根。彼作是說。諸有爲法有二自性。一大種、二心。離大種無所造色、離心無心所、諸色皆是大種差別、無色皆是心之差別。 (T 1545.27.730b25–29)
148. 阿毘達磨順正理論: The Apidamo shunzhengli lun; attrib. Saṃghabhadra; 80 fasc.; T 1562. Primarily a counterargument to some of the positions expressed in the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya from the perspective of the Sarvâstivāda school. Also referred to as the “Refutation of the Abhidharmakośa” 倶舍雹論. (DDB)
149. T 1562.29.395a1–2.
150. Following the text given in the CWSL and numerous other related texts, we have changed the character 分 in our source text to 界. See T 1585.31.36c25.
151. See the CWSL: 又如何說心遠獨行、染淨由心、士夫六界。 (T 1585.31.36c25–26). Also see the Shuji: 覺天所執亦依經故、經說三法和合名觸、乃至廣說。又說士夫六界、染淨由心、故無心所。 (T 1830.43.236c23–25). The character 故 after 士夫六界 here may be superfluous and misleading. Compare the similar line in the Zongjing lun 宗鏡録: 以經言士夫六界染淨由心無心所故。(T 2016.48.684b17–18).
152. The full text reads: 第三爲破邪執造論之中、又解各有小乘大乘師執。第一淸辨、依世俗諦心外有境、二倶非無。第二小乘中一說部、執一切法唯有假名都無心境、外道空見亦復如是。第三小乘、執心意識義一文異、攝大乘說心意識體一者是。第四上古大乘、亦有依莊嚴論執諸心所離心無體。如下心所問答中辨、故四各通大小二執、由此總應九句分別。第一解云、第一第二小乘大乘、執境執心非空非有、第三第四大乘小乘、執心執所非多非異。 (T 1831.43.617a14–24)
153. 順世外道: Lokâyatika—a materialistic school that arose in India about the sixth century B.C.E. They believed that that human existence was nothing more than a combination of physical elements and that the soul perishes with the body, with the pleasures of the senses being the highest good. (DDB)
154. The Cheng weishilun shuji says essentially the same thing: 若依此義四句分別。淸辨順世有境無心、中道大乘有心無境、小乘多部有境有心、邪見一說都無心境。 (T 1830.43.237a4–6).
155. 瑜伽師地論釋: by Jinaputra; trans. Xuanzang in 650; 1 fasc.; T 1580. The oldest surviving commentary on the Yogâcārabhūmi-śāstra. Jinaputra, who lived during the 6–7th centuries, is understood as having been a student of Dharmapāla and one of the ten masters of Yogâcāra whose discourse informs the CWSL. This work addresses some of the major themes of the Yogâcārabhūmi, such as the explanation of the seventeen stages. (DDB)
156. The full text says: 又發問者、略有五種。一不解故問、二疑惑故問、三試驗故問、四輕觸故問、五爲欲利樂有情故問。今是第五、專爲利樂諸有情類 造斯論。 (T 1580.30.885b2–5).
157. Cheng weishilun shuji. The source text reads: 云何諸世間說有我法。此則世間相違、違理之失、及諸聖教中亦說有我法。此則聖教相違、違教之失、非彼兔角等可說爲靑等。以本性無不可說故、我法本無云何起說。 (T 1830.43.237c21–25).
158. The basic function of consciousness can be said to be transformation, and according to the Yogâcāra school there are three main types of transformation: (1) The first is the transformation carried out by the store consciousness (ālayavijñāna), referred to here as the “retribution consciousness” 異熟識. Since the store consciousness represents the part of our mind that accumulates all the impressions from past experiences, this means that whatever we come across is immediately and subconsciously “contextualized” by our prior experiences. A vegetable patch is seen quite differently, depending on whether the viewer is a city dweller or a farmer. (2) The second is the transformation carried out by the manas or “ego” consciousness, referred to here as the “assessing” consciousness. The manas, like the ālayavijñāna, is continually active at the subconscious level, but plays the role of continually assessing the value of things in terms of their usefulness to its imaginary self. This means that before a cognitive event has even made its way to the level of conscious awareness, it has already been altered by these two conscious processes. (3) The third is the transformation that occurs at the level of conscious awareness, among the five sensory consciousnesses and the sixth, thinking consciousness, referred to here collectively as the consciousnesses that cognize objects 了別境識. Sentient beings vary greatly in terms of the capacity of their sensory organs, and cognition is also affected by the sharpness/dullness or emotional state of the thinking consciousness. Having passed through these three transformations, objects are finally consciously taken into awareness and reflected upon.
159. Skt. vipāka-vijñāna. Or maturing consciousness; ripening consciousness—a way of referring to the ālayavijñāna that emphasizes its function of bringing to maturation prior causes (or seeds); the consciousness that handles the fruitional economy. The fruition of prior karma is itself karmically neutral; were it not, karma would become hard determinism, since, for instance, bad karma would perpetuate itself endlessly.
160. The five sensory consciousness and the thinking consciousness. Francis Cook translates as “cognition of external objects,” but the sixth consciousness also takes as its objects mental images and linguistic constructs, which are not necessarily external.
161. While the commonly understood meaning of the logograph 宰 is that of director, administrator, etc., the more fundamental meaning as that of butcher, or cook—the person responsible for slaughtering livestock in early China. Thus, by extension it means to segment; to cut into pieces; to cut up ingredients for cooking a meal.
162. As Francis Cook does in Demonstration of Consciousness Only, it would be natural to take both 主宰 and 軌持 as compounds expressing single concepts, but since Daehyeon breaks them down to single-character units for explanation below, we are obliged to do the same here.
163. The full passage reads: “Since this thinking consciousness also references past and future cognition as its objects, it is possible to apprehend them in the present, without these objects and consciousnesses being included in the field of [present] conceptualization. Also, ‘existence’ refers to the establishment of the existent and the support of the existent. ‘Non-existence’ refers to the establishment of the non-existent and the support of the non-existent. Therefore they are all called ‘dharmas’ (concepts) based on this thinking consciousness with the meaning of existence.”由彼意識亦緣去來識爲境界、世現可得。非彼境識法處所攝。又、有性者安立有義、能持有義。若無性者安立無義、能持無義。故皆名法。由彼意識。於有性義。 (T 1579.30.584c27–a2).
164. 有義軌唯有法。持亦通無。 (T 1833.43.819c3).
165. From Kuiji’s Yuqie lun liaojian 唯識論料簡, which says: 意識心親能生者、唯影像故。聚集教唯在意識由此。 (XZJ 806.48.377a5).
166. The Ratnakuta-sūtra 大寶積經says: 是舍利子、是諸菩薩摩訶薩旣不放逸、能勤修習如理作意。若法是有如實知有、若法是無如實知無。 (T 310.11.207c20–22).
167. Stream-winner (Skt. srotâpanna) is the first of the four realizations 四果 of the śrāvaka path. The practitioner succeeds in breaking the deluded view of the three realms, and in pushing his/her own karmic flow clearly onto the path of enlightenment. A stream-winner is fully established in the course of Buddhist practice, and has severed the mistaken views of the three realms. A once-returner (sakṛd-āgāmin) is a religious practitioner who has only one more return to this life. (DDB)
168. As Kuiji notes in the Shuji, these first three dharmas of substance 實, quality 德, and activity 業 are also the first three of the six padârthas 六句義. See T 1830.43.240a22–b1.
169. A detailed explanation of these various manifestations of dharmas by Kuiji is found in his Cheng weishilun shuji at T 1830.43.240b12–26.
170. The notion of an enduring individuality that was understood by non-Buddhists to be the subject of transmigration. In Sāṃkhya philosophy, puruṣa, together with prakṛti, forms the basis of the foundation of the twenty-five categories of existence.
171. Viṃśatikā vijñapti-mātratā-siddhiḥ, by Vasubandhu, trans. in 661 by Xuanzang; 1 fasc.; T 1590. There are also translations by Bodhiruci (with the title 唯識論) and Paramârtha (with the title 大乘唯識論). One of Vasubandhu’s most philosophically important Yogâcāra works, it refutes the realism of the non-Buddhist and pre-Mahāyāna schools. Xuanzang’s version has been translated by Charles Hamilton (Wei Shih Er Lun) and Frances Cook (The Treatise in Twenty Verses on Consciousness Only by Vasubandhu). Translations not from Chinese include Anacker (Seven Works of Vasubandhu) and Kochumuttom (A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience). (DDB)
172. The source text reads: 安立大乘三界唯識、以契經說三界唯心、心意識了名之差別。 (T 1590.31.74b27–28). Kuiji comments in the Shuji: 心意識及了別、此之四名其體無異、但名差別。心積集義、意思量義、識了別義、了識達義應言了別。 (T 1830.43.981b14–16).
173. In the Shuji, Kuiji says: 述曰、此釋變義、此論一宗總有二釋、此卽初釋。護法等云、謂諸識體卽自證分、轉似相見二分而生。此說識體是依他性、轉似相見。二分非無亦依他起、依此二分執實二取、聖說爲無、非依他中無此二分、論說唯二依他性故。(T 1830.43.241a1–24).
174. Bandhuśri is listed by Kuiji in the Shuji as one of the ten masters of Yogâcāra. His dates are uncertain, but he is thought to have been a contemporary of Vasubandhu. Along with Citrabhāna, he is thought to have advocated the existence of only the subjective and objective parts of consciousness.
175. See Cheng weishilun shuji: 說相見種或同或異。若同種者、卽一識體轉似二分相用而生、如一蝸牛變生二角。(T 1830.43.241a10–12).
176. The source text makes this much clearer: 卽一識體轉似見分別用而生、識爲所依轉相分種似相而起。以作用別性各不同、故相別種。於理爲勝、故言識體轉似二分。此依他起非有似有、實非二分似計所執二分見相故立似名、相別有種何名識變。不離識故。由識變時相方生故。如大造色、由分別心相境生故、非境分別心方得生,故非唯境但言唯識。(T 1830.43.241a15–22)
177. Shuyao 護法正義質影二相與見分三、此三三性種子界繫等未要皆同、隨所應故。(T 1831.43.620a16–17)